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CHEVRON ABROAD
Kent Barnett* & Lindsey Vinson**
This Article presents our comparative findings of how courts in five other countries review
agency statutory interpretation. These comparisons permit us to understand and participate
better in current debates about the increasingly controversial Chevron doctrine in American
law, whereby courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that an agency administers. Those debates concern, among other things, Chevron’s purported inevitability, functioning, and normative propriety. Our inquiry into judicial review in Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia provides useful and unexpected findings. Chevron, contrary to some scholars’ views, is not inevitable because only one of these countries has something
analogous to Chevron. Indeed, one country has expressly rejected Chevron in dicta. Nevertheless, all but one or two of the countries (depending how one counts) have at least some limited
space for deference to agency statutory interpretations. We do not call for American law to wholesale adopt any particular country’s form of judicial review. But our comparative study provides
useful suggestions for improving Chevron’s overall functioning and for better grounding it on
its theoretical foundations.
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[M]uch of the discussion of political development has centered in recent years on the
institutions of constraint—the rule of law and democratic accountability. But before
governments can be constrained, they have to generate the power to actually do things.
—Francis Fukuyama1

INTRODUCTION
The eminent political scientist Francis Fukuyama noted the inherent
tension in ensuring that administrative agencies have freedom to act while
maintaining their democratic legitimacy by remaining within their legal strictures. Nearly a century before him, British legal scholar A.V. Dicey resolved
the tension by depriving agencies of any small-“c” constitutional space within
the British system. At most, agencies exercised some quasi-judicial power
that courts kept within strict statutory bounds and reviewed to ensure “judicial fairness and equity.”2 In contrast, Canadian scholar D.M. Gordon
accommodated some agency discretion within Dicey’s rule-of-law paradigm.
Gordon argued that courts should only consider whether agencies acted
within their statutory jurisdiction—not whether they properly exercised their
authority within that jurisdiction.3 American law professor Walter Gellhorn,
a contemporary of Gordon, summarized “the burning question” as “whether
and how much a court could review (and, in reviewing, revise) administrative
judgments.”4 At bottom, these scholars sought to strike the appropriate balance between promoting useful, expert agency action and limiting lawless,
unaccountable agency behaviors. The story of administrative law in the
United States—and elsewhere—is largely a never-ending odyssey to get this
balance right.
Indeed, history and some modern practices demonstrate the danger of
permitting either judicial control or agency discretion to run riot. For
instance, limited judicial review and limitless legislative delegation to the
1 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 54 (2014).
2 A.V. Dicey, The Development of Administrative Law in England, 31 L.Q. REV. 148, 151
(1915).
3 See Kent Roach, The Administrative Law Scholarship of D.M. Gordon, 34 MCGILL L.J. 1,
6–7 (1989).
4 WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 42–43 (1941).
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executive gave foundation to the Nazis’ rise to power in 1930s Germany.5 On
the flip side, extreme skepticism of bureaucracy and overbearing judicial
review in the Ukraine has stunted the maturation of Ukrainian agencies
likely because they have little incentive to do a good job when courts second
guess all agency decisionmaking.6
One tool in American administrative law to balance these concerns is the
canonical Chevron doctrine. Chevron requires courts to defer to reasonable
agency statutory interpretations when an agency interprets a statute that it
administers, instead of having courts themselves decide the best meaning of
the statute.7 Its champions extol its purported virtues: it respects the legislature’s delegation of interpretive primacy to expert agencies over policy
choices inherent in legal interpretation;8 it recognizes agencies’ superior
political accountability over unelected courts via congressional oversight and
presidential supervision;9 it encourages national uniformity and stability in
statutory interpretation;10 and it mitigates partisan judicial decisionmaking.11
Nevertheless, this established doctrine is under siege. Its detractors decry its
putative vices: it violates the Constitution;12 it permits statutory language to
5 See Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy,
and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s–1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1361–71 (2004)
(discussing impact of Weimar-era delegation with Nazi empowerment).
6 See Nicholas R. Bednar & Barbara Marchevsky, Deferring to the Rule of Law: A Comparative Look at United States Deference Doctrines, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1047, 1062–63 (2017) (considering how Ukraine reviews agency interpretations of statutes and regulations).
7 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
8 See, e.g., id. at 865; ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 29–30 (2016).
9 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751–52, 1791–92 (2007).
10 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 208 (2006)
(“If Chevron were not the law and were not followed faithfully, regulatory law—involving,
for example, the environment, communications, and labor-management relations—would
inevitably be highly variable across the country.”); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1112 (1987).
11 See Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1468 (2018) (finding, based on empirical analysis
of the largest database to date, “that Chevron deference significantly curbs (but does not
fully constrain) judicial discretion”). Other scholars have found that Chevron can affect
how panels review agency statutory interpretation. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168 (1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 870–71
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304–05, 345–46 (2004).
12 See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760–62 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Chevron deference presented “serious separation-of-powers questions” because it
either violates Article III’s vesting of judicial power in the courts or Article I’s nondelegation doctrine); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153–54 (10th Cir.
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have more than one meaning;13 its robust use encourages a more expansive
and unchecked administrative state;14 and its reticulated complexity demonstrates its practical unworkability.15 Accordingly, depending on one’s view,
either Chevron allows agencies a reasonable, but not boundless, space to
make policy, or it permits agency lawlessness through judicial abdication.
Out of this debate, scholars and judges have proposed various reforms.
Some have called for the courts to reconsider which preconditions must exist
for Chevron to apply.16 Some have called for rethinking or simplifying Chevron’s two-step analytical process.17 Some have called for abandoning it alto2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1187, 1205–14 (2016) (arguing that Chevron deference violates constitutional due process
by systematically preferring the government’s interpretation on judicial review).
13 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64 (noting that changed agency interpretations can
help signal that interpretive issue is committed to the agency’s discretion); Evan J. Criddle,
Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283 (2008) (“For traditionalists, Chevron’s
requirement that courts defer to administrative agencies’ shifting interpretations of ambiguous statutes on a continuing basis—even in the face of conflicting judicial interpretations—seemed to sweep aside the core rule-of-law values at the heart of judicial statutory
interpretation.” (first citing David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941–56 (1992); and then citing Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity,
Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1430 (2005) (“[I]f anything, the manner
in which Chevron arguably undermines continuity norms suggests that we ought to question—rather than celebrate—its breadth.”)).
14 See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 314–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1246–48 (1994)
(viewing Chevron, among other doctrines concerning judicial review and separation of powers, as having expanded administrative agencies’ powers beyond the Constitution’s original
understanding).
15 Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1157 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron has
presented its fair share of practical problems in its administration.”); Jack M. Beermann,
End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should
Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 783 (2010).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Any resolution of [a statutory] ambiguity by the administering agency that is authoritative—that represents the official position of the agency—must be accepted by the courts
if it is reasonable.”); Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 777 (2017) (questioning the Court’s major-questions exception); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116
HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002) (arguing that courts should consider original congressional statutory conventions for deciphering when Congress has delegated authority for agencies to
act with the force of law).
17 See, e.g., Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) (calling for a more “muscular” step two); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997) (arguing that removal of
the second step would eliminate redundancy and improve Chevron’s administrability);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing
Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994) (arguing that courts should
emphasize the first step on public policy grounds); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian
Vermeule, Essay, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing that two-
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gether—whether for pragmatic,18 statutory,19 or constitutional reasons.20
Indeed, at least a majority of the Supreme Court Justices has expressed misgivings about Chevron’s reach or very existence.21
Cutting through the din of this incessant controversy is a growing second-order contention—that, whatever its problems, Chevron is, to varying
degrees, inevitable in a legal system with a large, complex administrative
state. Although some marginal changes can improve the doctrine, Chevron
reflects a holistic political-judicial settlement over how judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations can recognize the limits of judicial prowess,
agencies’ epistemic advantage, and Congress’s preference for administrative
action.22
To evaluate Chevron’s inevitability and its possible mutations, we consider in this Article how other mature legal systems approach judicial review
of agency statutory interpretation. (Throughout this Article, references to
“judicial review” mean review of agency statutory interpretation, unless otherwise indicated.) Few well-developed, stable governments mirror the United
States’ structure of government by having three separate branches and a
presidential system.23 Accordingly, we have concentrated on countries that
share some of our governmental features: Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. All of the selected countries have parliamentary
systems, and all but the UK have separation of powers enshrined in a written
constitution. Germany and Italy provide civil-law examples, while the UK
step analysis should be collapsed to avoid a conceptual problem harmful to administrative
law doctrine).
18 See Beermann, supra note 15, at 782 (“Chevron . . . has proven to be a complete and
total failure, and thus the Supreme Court should overrule it at the first possible
opportunity.”).
19 See id. at 788–94 (arguing that Chevron is not consistent with the Administrative
Procedure Act); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV.
113, 193–99 (1998) (same).
20 See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
21 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (noting his concern over the
difficulty of deciphering whether a statute is clear or ambiguous, as required under Chevron’s step one); Joshua Matz, The Imminent Demise of Chevron Deference?, TAKE CARE BLOG
(June 21, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-imminent-demise-of-chevron-deference (“Before this Term, Chevron was already under siege. Chief Justice Roberts, as well as
Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and Gorsuch, had assailed and narrowed the doctrine in
published opinions, concurrences, and dissents.”). Justice Breyer has long advanced a
more contextual approach to judicial review. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S.
290, 308–09 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370
(1986).
22 See infra Section I.C.
23 Cf. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of
World Constitutionalism,” 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 604–12 (noting that, although the U.S.
Constitution has indirect influence, countries rarely adopt the U.S. constitutional model
without fundamental modifications).
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provides the common-law source for the American, Canadian, and Australian
common-law systems. These comparisons permit us to determine whether
civil-law and common-law systems have taken similar paths within and outside
of each system. Moreover, it helps us consider whether positive constitutional separation of powers might affect judicial review.
In brief, we found that all of the compared countries face the same
never-ending struggle between judicial review and agency discretion,
although some of the countries struggle in only a narrow category of cases.
But our theoretical and doctrinal comparative study indicates that these
countries approach judicial review, to varying degrees, in different ways, limiting our ability to draw any relationship between governmental structure
and deference.
Germany: Influenced by its conscious concern over the relationship
between judicial abdication and its Nazi past, Germany has its own two-step
deference doctrine that has a much more limited domain than Chevron. Deference in Germany is significantly limited to certain technical, scientific, or
economic matters that the legislature has delegated to the agency.
Italy: Despite not subjecting rulemakings to judicial review, Italy, after
tumultuous doctrinal shifts in the past few decades, has rejected judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations altogether for agency adjudication.
United Kingdom: The UK also generally rejects judicial deference,
although it defers in some instances for “special” matters decided by entities
that would be characterized as agencies under U.S. law.
Canada: Canadian judicial review comes the closest to Chevron with a
default reasonableness review grounded on a legislative delegation theory
whose domain has recently narrowed as the Supreme Court of Canada has
adopted a more categorical approach. The nature of reasonableness review
is highly faceted with procedural and substantive considerations.
Australia: Finally, although Australia is the only one of our studied countries to reject Chevron expressly, its High Court did so in dicta in a case that
did not implicate agency legal interpretation. Moreover, Australia continues
to have a very limited doctrine somewhat similar to Chevron when statutes
expressly give agencies exclusive jurisdiction and limit judicial review,
although it rarely applies in practice.24
After considering these foreign legal systems, we conclude that Chevron
is not inevitable if we understand Chevron to mean either its current two-step
formation or a judicial deference regime that fills a similar space. Italy and
the UK, despite some indications to the contrary, are best thought of as having eschewed Chevron deference. Two countries with something similar to
Chevron—Germany and Australia—give their deference doctrines significantly smaller domains than Chevron. Canada was the only country that we
studied that had a similar form of deference. Moreover, Chevron’s focus on
agency authority to act with the force of law and statutory ambiguity is nearly
always absent in other countries’ deference doctrines.
24

See infra Part II.
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Yet, our inquiry demonstrates that our compared countries, except for
Italy (and perhaps Britain), leave some remaining place for deference. If
Chevron is thought of as a metaphor for some kind of deferential space (even
if significantly limited) for the area between law and policy, Chevron is more
ubiquitous, if not inevitable. Canada likely has a similar place for deference
as American courts, although the Supreme Court of Canada, unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court, has recently reaffirmed reasonableness review’s accepted
place in Canadian jurisprudence. Germany, however, has created a limited
domain for deference: technical, special, or legislatively delegated matters.
Even Italy—which has clearly forsaken all deference for agency legal interpretation—still uses deferential rhetoric, and its recent doctrinal instability
does not provide confidence that deference will not return. The space for
deference across most of our compared countries suggests that Dicey’s call
for strict separation between law and policy proves difficult to establish in
fact—even if Chevron commands no monopoly over judicial review abroad.
Regardless of how one goes about assessing Chevron’s inevitability, our
study provides insights on how to improve Chevron deference by grounding it
in its theoretical bases. For example, the German experience provides an
example of how to provide clearer guidelines of when a legislative delegation
occurs by limiting delegation to matters within a narrower understanding of,
and more focused search for, agency expertise. Likewise, the Australian
experience provides guidance on courts requiring express indications from
the legislature that it has delegated interpretive, not only policymaking
authority, to agencies. Requiring that the legislature provide more direct signaling of delegation mitigates concerns over Chevron’s current multifaceted,
oblique search for inferred legislative delegation. If adequately defined and
limited, Chevron provides a way of easing the ever-present tension between
courts and agencies. If courts focus on expertise and express delegation and
thus unite doctrine and theory, Chevron gains additional legitimacy. Of
course, a search for expertise and delegation can prove indeterminate if
courts do not clarify the boundaries of each inquiry; the foreign approaches
give American courts, at the very least, a useful place to start.
Part I of this Article begins by briefly describing Chevron and its theoretical foundations. Part I continues by examining the development of American judicial-review doctrines concerning agency statutory interpretation and
leading scholarly responses. Part II considers how Germany, Italy, the UK,
Canada, and Australia approach judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation. Part III compares the various approaches to Chevron and identifies
lessons for understanding and reforming Chevron. Ultimately, we conclude
that our findings should give comfort to both those who promote and attack
Chevron: the variation that we found suggests that Chevron’s presence or
absence does not lead to authoritarian or failed governments, respectively.
I.

BECOMING, MAINTAINING,

AND

CHANGING CHEVRON

To compare other systems’ forms of judicial review and glean implications for Chevron, one need not know every twist and turn in the doctrine’s
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development or the most arcane scholarly criticisms. Instead, we provide
here a brief summary of the doctrinal developments, scholarly responses, and
judicial debates that are most germane to other jurisdictions’ versions of judicial review. We shall introduce more nuanced or esoteric approaches as necessary to inform our comparative analysis.
A.

Chevron and Its Theoretical Foundations

In Chevron, Congress required certain states under the amended Clean
Air Act (CAA) to establish permitting programs for “new or modified major
stationary sources” of air pollution.25 An Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulation had defined “stationary source” broadly to apply to all pollution-emitting devices within a manufacturing plant, not individual pollution-emitting devices. By doing so, the regulation required polluting entities
to obtain a permit only when modifications to emitting devices increased pollution plantwide, not when a specific emitting device increased pollution in
isolation.26 When environmentalists challenged the EPA’s definition, the
Supreme Court first asked “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”—that is, the meaning of “stationary source.”27 If it
had, the Court would have enforced Congress’s clear meaning.28 Because
Congress had not done so, the Court asked second whether the EPA’s interpretation was “permissible.”29 The Court decided that it was because it was
“a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests.”30 Thus,
the Court deferred to the EPA’s interpretation, regardless of whether the
Court thought that the EPA’s interpretation was the best one.31
Step one of Chevron allows reviewing courts to retain their traditional de
novo review over determining statutory meaning by using the “traditional
tools of statutory construction,”32 while step two leaves policymaking space to
the agency to resolve a statutory ambiguity reasonably.33 In Chevron itself,
the Court considered the statute’s text, scheme, purpose, and legislative history at step one.34 Over time, however, the Supreme Court has generally
25 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984) (quoting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (2018)).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 842.
28 Applying the two-step inquiry specifically to the Chevron facts, the Court concluded
that the statutory text in the CAA was broad, granting the EPA significant “power to regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.” Id. at 862. The Court
next looked to the legislative history of the CAA, finding that the ambiguous legislative
history was “consistent with the view that the EPA should have broad discretion in implementing the policies of” the CAA. Id.
29 Id. at 843.
30 Id. at 865.
31 See id. at 843 n.11.
32 Id. at 843 n.9.
33 See id. at 865.
34 See id. at 854–64.
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come to limit step one to a textual inquiry.35 Step two has evolved in a more
opaque fashion. The Court has recently indicated that step two is similar to
run-of-the-mill arbitrary-and-capricious review.36 Yet, when rejecting agency
interpretations at step two, the Court has engaged in a textualist and structural inquiry, akin to a more thorough step-one analysis.37 Lower courts,
when rejecting agency interpretations at step two, have been inconsistent,
although more often eschewing textualism in favor of arbitrary or purposive
review.38
The Court gave three reasons for deferring to the EPA. First, Chevron
respects congressional delegation of interpretive authority to agencies.39
This delegation theory has become the leading justification.40 Second, agencies have expertise and institutional advantage when resolving policy battles,
such as how best to fulfill the purposes of the statute.41 Finally, the constitutional separation of powers militates in favor of leaving policy matters to
agencies because they are more politically accountable than courts.42
In the decades after Chevron’s decision, the Court and scholars have provided an additional rationale. Evoking Peter Strauss’s view,43 the Court in
City of Arlington v. FCC identified national interpretive uniformity as support
for Chevron deference: “Thirteen Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-thecircumstances test would render the binding effect of agency rules unpredictable and destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of Chevron.”44 One of us,
along with two other coauthors, has conducted the largest empirical examination of Chevron in the federal circuit courts over an eleven-year period.45
We found that Chevron, as compared to other standards of judicial review for
35 See generally Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007) (arguing that Court has moved from an intentionalist
to a textualist inquiry at step one). Recently, the Court suggested that step one should also
include purposive and historical inquiries. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct.
2131, 2144 (2016).
36 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1455 (2018).
37 See id. at 1451–53.
38 See id. at 1466 fig.5.
39 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
40 See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2015) (noting that
the “delegation theory reigns supreme,” despite the Court’s referring to other values from
time to time); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 192 (2006) (describing how Justices Breyer and Scalia, despite their opposing views of Chevron analysis, had
independently come to the same understanding that “roots the decision in a theory of
implicit congressional delegation of law-interpreting power to administrative agencies”).
41 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864. The Court reasoned that the EPA was more equipped
than judges to make policy choices because those choices accommodated “manifestly competing interests” within a “technical and complex” regulatory scheme. Id. at 865.
42 See id. at 865–66.
43 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 1121.
44 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013).
45 See Barnett et al., supra note 11, at 1467.
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agency statutory interpretation, mutes partisan decisionmaking and thereby
provides more nationwide judicial uniformity.46
B.

The Deference Trinity

Despite a significant historical provenance, Chevron’s current established
place in administrative law was not obvious. Chevron emerged victorious by
the late twentieth century as one of three lines of judicial-review doctrine.
But several Supreme Court Justices and scholars have sought to reconsider
Chevron’s status. In response to these challenges, another group of scholars
has argued, to varying degrees, that Chevron—or something like—it is
inevitable.
Before the birth of Chevron’s two-step formulation in 1984, the Supreme
Court had developed three lines of judicial-review cases. The first line
applied de novo review of agency statutory interpretations.47 The second
line—exemplified by 1944’s Skidmore v. Swift & Co.48—had courts evaluate
the thoroughness, reasoning, and consistency of the agency’s interpretation
while having courts retain interpretive primacy over statutory
interpretation.49
The third line was the proto-Chevron line, requiring courts to defer to
reasonable agency statutory interpretations. As part of this third line, epitomized by NLRB v. Hearst Publications,50 the Court relied upon the delegation
theory51 and stated that it was unnecessary “to make a completely definitive
limitation around the term” at issue.52 Ultimately, like Chevron, Hearst created standards that “permit[ted] de novo review of pure questions of law, but
require[d] deferential rational basis review of mixed questions of law and
fact.”53
The Hearst line had significant pedigree, even if its family tree did not
clearly identify its judicial ancestors. The Court has in two ways long
deferred to agencies’ legal interpretations. First, courts would grant writs of
46 See id. at 1468.
47 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1, at 157 (5th ed. 2010)
(listing de novo review decisions before Chevron).
48 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
49 See id. at 139–40.
50 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (“[W]here the question is
one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited. . . . [T]he Board’s determination that specified persons are ‘employees’ under this
Act is to be accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.”); see
also PIERCE, supra note 47, § 3.1, at 156–57 (describing pre-Chevron precursors).
51 Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130 (“[The task to interpret the statute] has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. Determination of ‘where all
the conditions of the relation require protection’ involves inquiries for the Board charged
with this duty.”).
52 Id.
53 Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1068 (1995).
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mandamus only for ministerial, not discretionary, matters.54 Indeed, foreshadowing Chevron’s delegation theory, the Court in Marbury v. Madison
stated that the writ was improper for “[q]uestions . . . which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive.”55 Likewise, the Court in Decatur v. Paulding explained that the executive’s “exercise [of] judgment and
discretion” when “expounding the laws . . . of Congress” were not “ministerial
duties.”56 That said, Aditya Bamzai argues that when the agency was not a
party to the litigation, courts only considered the consistency and contemporaneity of an agency’s interpretation.57 Second, Ilan Wurman argues that
agencies from the Founding had the “specification” or “completion” power
to fill in statutory gaps.58 These discretionary spaces may be for legal interpretation or perhaps what modern minds might think of as mixed questions
or policy questions.59
The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) could have picked a winner in the three-horse race over proper judicial review, but its choice—if
there was one—only created more uncertainty.60 As relevant here, the APA
stated that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
[and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”61 This provision, as
Bamzai has argued, is best read as requiring de novo judicial review of agency
statutory interpretation with or without Skidmore considerations.62 But Cass
Sunstein has recently argued that the legislative history and lack of any objection to the Court’s continued use of the Hearst standard right after the APA’s
enactment demonstrates the contrary.63 Some scholars and courts have
argued that the APA permits Chevron review because step two reasonableness
review is or should be coextensive with APA § 706(2)(A) arbitrary-and-capricious review that courts use for policy-based decisions.64 Perhaps given the
54 See PIERCE, supra note 47, § 3.3, at 162–63.
55 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
56 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840).
57 See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE
L.J. 908, 941–47 (2017).
58 See Ilan Wurman, The Specification Power, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 689, 709–11 (2020).
59 See id. at 732.
60 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2018).
61 Id. § 706.
62 Bamzai, supra note 57, at 985–94; see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142,
1153 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
63 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1652–57 (2019).
64 See Levin, supra note 17, at 1254 (arguing that the arbitrary-and-capricious test
found in the APA and Chevron step two “should be deemed not just overlapping, but identical”); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES § 3.03, at 85 (John
F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005); supra note 36 and accompanying text (referring to
Supreme Court’s recent expressed views). Others disagree. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L.
REV. 313, 326–27 (1996); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 n.15 (2009) (“[T]his Article proceeds under the under-
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APA’s unclear charge, the Supreme Court has applied all three lines of cases
in a manner that bedeviled lower courts and scholars.65
Without mentioning the APA, the Chevron Court gave the Hearst line a
prominent place in judicial review.66 Lower courts, especially the influential
D.C. Circuit, construed Chevron as adopting the Hearst standard for reviewing
agency statutory interpretations.67 Contrary to Justice Scalia’s view that Chevron displaced Skidmore and de novo review for statutes that an agency
administers,68 later Court decisions confirmed that even if Chevron had a
principal role in judicial review of agency statutory interpretation, Skidmore69
and de novo review70 had supporting parts.
To determine which standard of review applies, the Court created Chevron “step zero.”71 As most relevant to our discussion, the Court applies Chevron when agencies have used congressionally bestowed authority to act under
the statute at issue with the “force of law.”72 Actions with the force of law
generally include notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal “on the record”
adjudication, and less common formal “on the record” rulemaking, but it
may also include less formal actions from time to time.73 The Court has
confirmed that Chevron’s applicability does not distinguish between so-called
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” statutory questions.74 Indeed, the
Court clarified that it would not apply Chevron to only “humdrum, run-of-themill” matters but not “big, important ones.”75 Two years later, however, the
Court seemed to do just that in King v. Burwell.76 Under what is referred to
as the “major-questions” doctrine,77 the Court refused to infer congressional
delegation under Chevron for agencies to answer a “question of deep ‘economic and political significance,’ ” especially if the agency lacked expertise in
the subject matter at issue.78

standing that arbitrary and capricious review and Step Two of Chevron deference are distinct in what they require . . . .”).
65 PIERCE, supra note 47, § 3.1, at 156.
66 See Bamzai, supra note 57, at 997–98.
67 See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the
Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2013).
68 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69 See id. at 235, 237 (majority opinion).
70 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015).
71 Sunstein, supra note 40, at 207–11.
72 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
73 See id. at 230–31.
74 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296–97 (2013).
75 Id. at 297.
76 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
77 See, e.g., Coenen & Davis, supra note 16, at 779.
78 King, 576 U.S. at 486 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014)).
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Chevron’s Inevitability

In recent years, Chevron has come under attack. Some—including U.S.
Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch—contend that
the doctrine violates the Constitution. Chevron may violate Article III because
courts no longer say “what the law is,”79 Article I because Congress has
unconstitutionally delegated authority to agencies,80 or Due Process because
the court favors the government’s interpretation.81 Others have asserted
Chevron violates statutory law82—namely, the APA’s call for “the reviewing
court [to] decide all relevant questions of law.”83 Still others have questioned whether Chevron as a matter of administrative common law has simply
proved too complicated and uncertain to be useful84 or, more minimally,
whether it needs further modification.85
Regardless of Chevron’s constitutional, statutory, or pragmatic propriety,
is strong judicial deference to expert agencies nonetheless inevitable? Certain leading scholars, to varying degrees, think so.
Jeff Pojanowski, for one, has suggested that courts without Chevron will
still distinguish legal from policy issues, possibly moving and better clarifying
the boundary between them. He engaged in a thought experiment of replacing Chevron deference with de novo review of agency statutory interpretations.86 Under de novo review, courts would have to distinguish more
consciously between legal interpretation and policymaking, instead of using
Chevron’s second step to smooth over how courts should categorize questions
on the borderline.87 Courts might decide more interpretive matters as legal
79 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Michigan v. EPA, 576
U.S. 743, 761–62 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d
263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Chevron . . . [is] contrary
to the roles assigned to the separate branches of government . . . .”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1153–54 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
80 See Michigan, 576 U.S. at 762 (Thomas, J., concurring); Egan, 851 F.3d at 279 (Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment). Although leading scholar Cass Sunstein once argued
that Chevron was “in tension with the nondelegation doctrine,” he has since disavowed this
view. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 927 n.140 (2003).
81 See Hamburger, supra note 12, at 1189 (arguing that Chevron is a form of systemic
bias in favor of the government that offends due process).
82 See Bamzai, supra note 57, at 985–94.
83 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
84 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1157 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron has
presented its fair share of practical problems in its administration.”); Beermann, supra
note 15, at 783.
85 See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 21, at 2150–54 (“Chevron encourages the Executive
Branch . . . to be extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting
statutory authorizations and restraints.”).
86 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2016).
87 See id. at 1087. By doing away with Chevron, courts could treat questions of agency
statutory interpretation as they treat other difficult questions of statutory interpretation
and treat questions of policy under the standard arbitrary-and-capricious review prescribed
by the APA. Id. Pojanowski argues that litigation should be simpler without Chevron
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ones than they currently do, especially if they robustly use tools of interpretation, as Justice Scalia had advocated.88 Nonetheless, courts would still have
to leave a policymaking space for expert agencies when lawyerly skill did not
produce a correct answer to the interpretive issue.89 Chevron and its current
boundaries might not be inevitable, but Chevron’s key concern over distinguishing legal interpretation from policy is.
Kristin Hickman and Nicholas Bednar go further than Pojanowski by
contending that Chevron deference, or something close to it, is inevitable as a
standard of review in an administrative state.90 As a standard of review, Chevron “facilitat[es] the organization of legal arguments and help[s] judges to
think about their role” in reviewing agency work product.91 Chevron, or its
ilk, is necessary to keep courts from intruding into delegated policymaking
space.92 Chevron is simply candid in admitting that not all legal questions
have clear answers. Hickman and Bednar echo Pojanowski by arguing that
some statutory questions lack answers that can be found through “traditional
common law reasoning.”93 Indeed, Hickman and Bednar note that review
without Chevron leads to perverse incentives:
When faced with two competing, seemingly reasonable interpretations of a
statute, and when traditional tools of statutory construction fail to provide a
clear answer, many judges will be inclined simply to side with the agency . . . .
With Chevron deference as an option, courts . . . are free to say so as the basis
for their decision. Without that alternative, courts . . . may very well still side
with the agency but with less transparency . . . .94

Chevron is inevitable because courts, without lawyerly tools to pick a correct
answer, will likely rely upon agencies one way or the other.
Adrian Vermeule agrees that judicial deference doctrines in general,
including Chevron, are inevitable because lawyers and judges have recognized
the limits of the judiciary and lawyerly institutional advantage over expert
agencies.95 Law provides value by keeping agencies from the folly of extreme
unreasonableness,96 but it provides marginal returns when it seeks to disbecause parties will not have to litigate which standard of review applies, see id. at 1081–82,
or whether the statute, at step one, “really, really means something,” see id. at 1083. Yet,
parties will still have to debate—even under his theory—whether de novo, Skidmore, or
arbitrary-and-capricious review is the appropriate standard of review.
88 See id. at 1086–89.
89 See id. at 1086.
90 Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1392, 1398, 1444 (2017) (“With all of the debates and complaints about Chevron deference, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Chevron is, primarily, just a standard of review
rather than a rule of decision.”).
91 Id. at 1444.
92 See id. at 1398.
93 Id. at 1447.
94 Id. at 1460.
95 See VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 21–22; see also id. at 212–13.
96 See id. at 7.
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place nonlegal, policy-based decisionmaking.97 Courts’ recognition of their
own limits arose not by the force of the administrative state or Congress but,
he asserts, “by a considered, deliberate, voluntary, and unilateral surrender.”98 Indeed, along with Cass Sunstein, Vermeule contends that courts
have turned to institutional competence to resolve how courts should oversee
the administrative state because constitutional, separation-of-powers questions are devoid of clear answers.99
When considering Chevron specifically, Vermeule concludes that judicial
review would not meaningfully change even in Chevron’s absence. “Judicial
deference to administrative interpretations of law, in various forms and with
varying weights, preceded Chevron by decades, in a kind of twilight between
de jure and de facto . . . .”100 In fact, he argues that the Supreme Court’s
recognition of the dichotomy between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional
questions as incoherent served as a rejection of one of the common law’s key
assumptions.101 On a more pragmatic level, Vermeule is much less sanguine
than Pojanowski that factfinding, policymaking, and legal interpretation can
be easily distinguished and reviewed differently.102
Similar to Vermeule, Canadian legal scholar Matthew Lewans contends
that reasonableness review of agency action—in its various forms—has a normative foundation. He notes that common-law systems have struggled with
the administrative state’s location between the two competing powers—legislative power and judicial common-law power.103 Influential British constitutional scholar A.V. Dicey recommended that judicial common-law authority
had to prevail over legislative autonomy and thus treat challenges to government action the same as those against individuals with de novo review.
Lewans criticizes Dicey for failing to acknowledge that the common law had
long distinguished between government and other action by deferring to
government action.104 Lewans argues that reasonableness review—by keeping agencies within statutory parameters while granting them policymaking
space—is the answer for this longstanding power struggle and has (commonlaw style) constitutional foundation.105 Indeed, Michael Herz has suggested
that Chevron deference—with a more searching step one or step zero—may
97 See id. at 22.
98 Id. at 6.
99 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 80, at 909.
100 VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 31 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Peter Strauss has
argued that Chevron is one of many devices that the Supreme Court uses to account for
“management dilemmas” in overseeing a large federal judiciary. See Strauss, supra note 10,
at 1095, 1121–22. Chevron, thus, results from courts recognizing that their resources are
better used elsewhere.
101 See VERMEULE , supra note 8, at 35–36.
102 See id. at 28.
103 See, e.g., MATTHEW LEWANS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 10–11
(2018).
104 See id. at 16–25.
105 See id. at 13.
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have achieved the appropriate balance of judicial oversight and agency policymaking space.106
Although Pojanowski, Hickman and Bednar, Vermeule, and Lewans
approach Chevron and larger questions of judicial review in different ways,
they share one key view: separating legal questions from policymaking is necessary at some level, even if often difficult. Moreover, they agree generally
that legal questions are for courts and policy decisions are appropriately for
agencies. They may not agree that Chevron in its current state is the perfect
way of reconciling these competing forces. But they all recognize that courts
have to find a way to balance judicial authority and appropriate delegation.
II.

FOREIGN APPROACHES

TO

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

Our purpose in this project was to determine whether major foreign
jurisdictions’ approaches to judicial review provide insight on Chevron’s
design and inevitability. In this Part, we describe the governmental structure
of five countries and how they approach reviewing agency legal interpretations. Notably, these countries provide a range of examples in governmental
structure and in their approaches to deference.
In choosing among jurisdictions, we first had to limit our study to a
handful of countries because of space constraints in the law review format.
We sought to consider both civil-law and common-law countries to ascertain
whether the differing legal traditions treated deference to agency statutory
interpretations differently. For civil-law countries, we studied Germany and
Italy based on our desire to study influential legal systems and, pragmatically,
the ease of locating sources and translations. As for common-law countries,
which share legal traditions with the United States, we settled on the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Each of the three common-law countries
has a substantial body of scholarship on judicial review. They also allowed us
to review two legal systems with positive, constitutional separation of powers
and federalist systems (Canada and Australia), and one without either positive separation of powers or federalism (the UK). All our selected countries
have parliamentary systems, and all but one (the UK) have some form of
positive, constitutional separation of powers. Although we considered studying a legal system that more closely tracked the American presidential and
federalist model, few countries have followed the American design. The
most obvious subject was perhaps Brazil,107 but our review of translated
materials convinced us that our inquiry would prove too limited.
Although we shall save the insights of our comparative inquiry concerning Chevron for Part III, one thing becomes apparent by the end of this Part.
Courts in all legal systems, despite differing governmental structures and
legal traditions, face the same challenge that Fukuyama, Dicey, Gordon, and
106 See Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1871, 1909 (2015).
107 See generally Keith S. Rosenn, Separation of Powers in Brazil, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 839
(2009) (comparing Brazil’s governmental system with the United States’).
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Gellhorn identified—if and how courts should defer to agency statutory
interpretations as they seek to balance legal constraint with expert discretion.
Yet, they approach the difficulty, to varying degrees, in different ways.
Before proceeding, we issue four caveats. First, our discussion is necessarily limited in scope to comparative doctrines or practices that are most similar to Chevron, not all forms of judicial review of agency action. As is the case
with American judicial review, the line between statutory interpretation and
policymaking can be difficult to discern and can lead observers to categorize
one kind of agency action in different ways. Likewise, our brief summaries of
each country’s governmental structure are necessarily truncated. But even
limited summaries permit us to consider whether American legal characteristics help or fail to explain Chevron’s existence and controversy. Second, for
non-English-speaking countries, we rely only upon materials available in
English. Thankfully, these sources were sufficiently numerous and consistent
with one another to provide us confidence in our review. Third, our purpose
here is not to critique any system of judicial review. Instead, we seek to compare standards of review and discern whether standards similar to Chevron
have become inevitable in other legal systems. Finally, although we provide
some discussion of standards of review concerning both legal interpretations
and other agency actions, our limited focus here precludes us from determining if judicial discretion to agencies may work its way into de novo review
or the review of other agency actions, whether expressly or implicitly.108
A.

Civil-Law Countries

We begin with two civil-law countries (Germany and Italy) and continue
with three common-law countries (the UK, Canada, and Australia). Given
the necessarily limited number of examined countries as part of our comparative case studies, we are not in a position to establish any kind of definitive
relationships between legal structure and the intensity of judicial review.
And at any rate, even our limited inquiries indicate that such relationships
are unlikely. The countries that we study here have meaningfully different
forms of judicial review, even if they share similar legal systems and similar
theoretical concerns over judicial review.
1.

The Limited German “Two-Step”

The German Constitution or “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz) creates a federal
government with a federal authority (Bund) and state authorities
(Länder).109 The American and German federations share certain similari108 For instance, Australian courts may either reframe disputes as factual or policy matters or invoke a tribunal’s expertise to limit judicial intervention. See Fleur Kingham, Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Australia, in DEFERENCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 39, 53 (Guobin Zhu ed., 2019).
109 Jürgen Adam & Christoph Möllers, Unification of Laws in the Federal System of Germany,
in FEDERALISM AND LEGAL UNIFICATION: A COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF
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ties, for instance: the states largely exercise general police powers,110 the
states have powers that are not expressly granted to the federal government
(similar to the Tenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution),111 and the federal government has exclusive and concurrent powers that displace any contrary state law.112
The German Constitution also provides significant separation of powers,
although that separation deviates in key ways from the American model.113
Because of its parliamentary system, the separation between the executive
and legislative branches is less strict than in American government.114 Nonetheless, checks on the government come from the parliamentary opposition
and minority rights in the German Constitution.115 Checks, too, come from
the German courts and the civil service, both of which have significant independence.116 Moreover, the German system has stricter separation of functions than the United States, whereby in nearly all instances only the
legislature can make law, only the executive can execute law, and only the
judiciary can adjudicate.117 Indeed, unlike the deference that American
agencies receive as to fact and certain law when adjudicating disputes under
the APA between private parties, German agencies’ factual determinations
are subject to plenary de novo judicial review, although courts treat discreTWENTY SYSTEMS § 9.1, at 237 (Daniel Halberstam & Mathias Reimann eds., Ius Gentium:
Compar. Persps. on L. & Just. Vol. 28, 2014).
110 See id. § 9.2.2.1, at 241–42.
111 See id. (“Article 30 and Article 70 sec. 1 [of the Grundgesetz] formulate as a general
principle that all residual powers not mentioned in the federal constitution are vested
exclusively in the component states.”).
112 See id.
113 See David P. Currie, Separation of Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 41 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 201, 202 (1993). Notably, as most relevant here, Germany and Italy modified
parliamentary supremacy by imposing separation of powers guarantees. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 635–40 (2000).
114 See Currie, supra note 113, at 202.
115 See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], arts. 44, 45a(2), 93(1) (Ger.), translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
116 See Currie, supra note 113, at 202–03 (“[I]n some respects [German judges] are better protected from executive or legislative influence than their counterparts in the United
States.”); see also id. at 233–34 (discussing civil service); id. at 242–47 (discussing courts);
FUKUYAMA, supra note 1, at 77–79 (discussing resilient autonomy of German civil service
since the early 1800s). As most relevant here, Germany has courts for civil and criminal
matters (Bundesgerichtshof), administrative courts (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), labor
(Bundesarbeitsgericht), and social security courts (Bundessozialgericht). Trial and appellate
courts for each of these categories are at the state level, and a federal appellate court can
hear important cases from these state courts. See Adam & Möllers, supra note 109, § 9.4.1,
at 247; Currie, supra note 113, at 239–40. Germany’s courts do not have formally binding
precedent, but federal caselaw largely has informal binding effect. See Adam & Möllers,
supra note 109, § 9.4.1, at 248. The states and the federal government all have separate
constitutional courts. See id. at 249.
117 See Currie, supra note 113, at 203; see also id. at 243–44 (discussing separation of
functions (besondere Organe)).
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tionary matters (as discussed below) differently.118 That said, German law
expressly permits Parliament to grant agencies authority to promulgate regulations with the force of law, but it has a more robust nondelegation doctrine.119 Like their American counterparts, German agencies lack inherent
authority and instead derive their authority only from statute.120
Germany’s stricter nondelegation doctrine and separation of powers are
a response to Germany’s Nazi past.121 A wealth of overbroad delegations to
the executive in the 1920s, culminating in the Nazi’s Enabling Act of 1933
(Ermächtigungsgesetz), diminished the German parliamentary system in favor
of executive dictatorial authority and provided the Nazis with the legal
authority necessary to implement their policies with little judicial oversight.122 The post–World War II German Constitution reflected a fear of
repeating history if agencies were again given broad enabling laws. The Constitution (adopted in 1949) “clearly required the legislature to specify the
‘content, purpose, and extent’ . . . of the legislative authorization in the statutes.”123 Moreover, the Constitution focuses on protecting human dignity
and ensuring that “all law has to be made in conformity with the procedural
118 See id. at 203; see also id. at 250–52, 252 n.281 (“The highest administrative court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) has been even more explicit: ‘If two or more lawful decisions
are possible, Art. 19(4) does not require that the choice among them be made on the
ultimate responsibility of the court.’” (quoting Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Federal Administrative Court], 39 BVERWGE 197, 205 (1971)); see also Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Discretion in
German Administrative Law: Doctrinal Discourse Revisited, 6 EUROPEAN PUB. L. 69, 71 (2000).
119 While GG Article 80(1) allows federal legislation “to empower any federal minister,
or the federal or state government as a whole, to promulgate regulations (‘Rechtsverordnungen’) having the force of law,” the statute must specify the “content, purpose, and
extent . . . of the authorization.” See Currie, supra note 113, at 218.
120 See id. at 209, 214; see also GG art. 20(3) (“The legislature shall be bound by the
constitutional order, the executive, and the judiciary by law and justice.”). Germany, like
the United States, also has a somewhat controversial use of independent agencies, whose
constitutional pedigree is far from settled. See Currie, supra note 113, at 237–38. German
independent agencies, however, unlike their American counterparts, are tribunals that
lack rulemaking authority. See Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 859, 882
(2011) (“[I]n many countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom), the powers of
independent agencies were limited to prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers and did not
include rulemaking powers, which were retained by government ministries.”).
121 See Currie, supra note 113, at 217–18.
122 See Cheng-Yi Huang, Judicial Deference to Legislative Delegation and Administrative Discretion in New Democracies: Recent Evidence from Poland, Taiwan, and South Africa, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 466, 466 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010);
Lindseth, supra note 5, at 1361–71 (discussing impact of Weimar-era delegation with Nazi
empowerment); see also Florian Becker, The Development of German Administrative Law, 24
GEO. MASON L. REV. 453, 454 (2017) (“Administrative law was not, and maybe had never
been, just a tool to deal with everyday problems but also a sharp instrument of the new
rulers to shape Germany to their liking.”).
123 Huang, supra note 122, at 466 & n.1 (describing this idea as the German “intelligible principle” (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 126 (1994))).
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and substantive rules of the constitution.”124 To further these objectives,
Germany codified its administrative law (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
(“VwVfG”)) in 1976.125
Consistent with its desire to limit agency power, Germany has developed
strong judicial review of administrative action.126 In fact, Article 19(4) of the
Basic Law creates a constitutional right to review of administrative acts, providing that “[s]hould any person’s rights be violated by public authority, he
may have recourse to the courts.”127 Because the VwVfG generally excuses or
permits the subsequent cure of procedural errors,128 substantive review is the
more important form of judicial review (when permitted). Within this strict
substantive review, however, Germany has carved out areas for agency discretionary decisionmaking.129 Judicial review is informed by two fairly robust
principles of judicial deference to agency action: “administrative discretion”
(Ermessen) and “margin of appreciation” (Beurteilungsspielraum).130 These
two categories attempt to distinguish, as American law does, between discretionary decisions that courts review for arbitrary action and legal interpretations that courts review under Chevron (or other forms of review).
When Parliament has explicitly bestowed authority by statute to agencies
to select “alternative courses of action that may follow from an applicable
norm (the so-called Rechtsfolgenseite),” courts will not review their “administrative discretion.”131 Words such as “can” or “may” in the statute trigger
administrative discretion132 and signal to courts that the agency has nonreviewable substantive decision-making authority.133 As long as the agency
acted within its legislative grant of authority and relied upon proper reasons,
124 Becker, supra note 122, at 454–55.
125 Id. at 471.
126 See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 321 (2010).
127 GG art. 19(4). Although the German Constitution seems to strongly favor judicial
review for rights violations, it does not define “rights” (or clearly indicate whether they
refer to more than the “Basic Rights” listed in the “Basic Rights” part of the Constitution,
Articles 1 through 19). It also does not define the nature of judicial review. See id.
128 See, e.g., Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [VwVfG] [Administrative Procedure Act], May
25, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] §§ 45–46, as amended Viertes Gesetz zur Änderung
verwaltungsverfahrensrechtlicher Vorschriften–4 [VwVfÄndG], Dec. 11, 2008, https://
germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=289 (discussing permissible curing of defects and a
harmless-error review).
129 See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 126, at 321. Although early-twentiethcentury leading German administrative scholar Otto Mayer advocated providing limited
judicial review when the state had certain “close” relationships with individuals (such as
students or prisoners), Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court rejected the relationshipbased distinction in the 1970s. See Becker, supra note 122, at 466.
130 Francesca Bignami, Formal Versus Functional Method in Comparative Constitutional Law,
53 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 442, 463 (2016).
131 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 126, at 319.
132 Id.; Jan S. Oster, The Scope of Judicial Review in the German and U.S. Administrative Legal
System, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1267, 1269 (2008).
133 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 126, at 319.
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then the agency decision to take action and to remedy the regulatory violation will stand and courts will not consider arguments that better choices
were available.134 The courts, however, will continue to decide statutory definitions and factual matters de novo (except as described below).135
The margin-of-appreciation doctrine is similar, but theoretically different from agency discretion. Margin of appreciation focuses on judicial deference to agency interpretations of “indeterminate legal terms.”136 The theory
for the doctrine is that the legislature can delegate to agencies the power to
interpret indefinite legal concepts.137 Scholars and judges have both recognized that the margin-of-appreciation doctrine is only for exceptional circumstances138 (usually matters of risk139 or valuation140) and requires
explicit or implicit legislative authorization.141 The doctrine has proven controversial, much like Chevron, with some arguing that the decisionmaker is
bound “to one correct solution just as [with] any other legal concept even if
the difficulty of identifying that solution may give the decision maker a certain room or judgment de facto.”142
The margin-of-appreciation doctrine’s resemblance to Chevron is readily
apparent and grows stronger upon closer study.143 Both are grounded in
legislative delegation theory, whether explicit or implicit. Both also attempt
to discern legislative delegation by considering the agency’s expertise. Chevron expressly referred to expertise,144 and later King v. Burwell refused to
grant an agency deference when, among other things, the interpretation at
issue was not within the agency’s expertise.145 The German inquiry is more
134 Id. at 319–20; see Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 74–75.
135 See Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 72–74.
136 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 126, at 320; see also Arai-Takahashi, supra
note 118, at 75.
137 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 75. That limited review is similar in nature to
American judicial review under APA § 706 for discretionary decisions. Cf. Oster, supra
note 132, at 1271 (listing the matters for judicial review, including that the agency followed
proper procedure and did not consider irrelevant matters).
138 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 126, at 320; see also Arai-Takahashi, supra
note 118, at 76 (“Both the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional
Court follow the policy of scrupulously examining indefinite legal concepts, limiting the
recognition of Beurteilungsspielraum to a small number of cases.”). Oster provides some
examples: the definitions of markets that the agency can regulate or the meaning of “dangerous” as to air pollution. See Oster, supra note 132, at 1272.
139 See Richard L. Williamson Jr. & Monika Böhm, Dirty Water: Lessons for Comparative
Public Law and International Governance from Wastewater Regulation in the United States and
Germany, 43 ENV’T L. REP. 10237, 10245 n.68 (2013).
140 See Oster, supra note 132, at 1272 (“Indefinite legal terms (unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe)
are terms that require a valuation.”).
141 See Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 75.
142 JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 42 (1986).
143 See, e.g., Oster, supra note 132, at 1268, 1273.
144 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
145 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015).
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pointed because it limits delegations under the margin-of-appreciation doctrine to a category of “indefinite legal terms” (unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe).
Under this categorical approach, indefinite legal terms refer to statutory
terms from natural, economic, or other science146—matters for which
agency expertise is useful.147 Save one detour in the 1970s when Germany’s
Federal Administrative Court appeared to look for statutory ambiguity as the
trigger for deference, the courts have limited deference “to a small number
of cases.”148 Indeed, consistent with this much smaller place for deference in
German than American law, two authors have reported that German judges
“were simply dumbfounded” when they learned of Chevron.149 At the same
time, German legal scholars’ support for the margin-of-appreciation doctrine
sounds much like American scholarly support for Chevron: the doctrine recognizes agencies’ better democratic accountability, agencies have more
expertise than courts, more than one interpretation may be possible (unlike
with de novo or Skidmore review under American law), and additional legislative specificity may stultify administrative effectiveness.150
Like Chevron, the Germany margin-of-appreciation inquiry has two steps.
But the German steps overlap with each other significantly and differ from
Chevron’s: (1) there must be an indefinite legal term, and (2) the legislature
must have granted deference to the agency to define that legal term.151 Both
steps focus on notions of expertise. The former looks for the right kind of
term at issue—one that is scientific or technical for which the agency has
expertise. The latter has proven more difficult. To decide when implicit
delegations exist, courts consider whether the agency has more comparative
expertise than courts. Given the difficulty in the latter inquiry, courts have
generally refused to give deference.152
Despite some similarity between Chevron and the German doctrine’s step
one, their second steps differ in focus. At step one, both inquiries focus on
the nature of the statutory term at issue. Yet the German doctrine is more
limited and easier to administer by focusing on whether the term is of a particular type (scientific, etc.), not whether it is sufficiently clear.153 Chevron
step two considers the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation to
ensure that the agency stayed within the bounds of its delegated authority,
146 See Oster, supra note 132, at 1272.
147 Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision concerning a different deference doctrine, indicated that agencies should not receive deference for their interpretation of common-law terms or other matters on which they lack comparative-expertise-based
advantage over courts. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019).
148 Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 76 (footnote omitted).
149 Williamson & Böhm, supra note 139, at 10245.
150 See Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 77 (first citing Fritz Ossenbühl, Rechtsquellen
und Rechtsbindungen der Verwaltung, in ALLEGMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 112, 202 (HansUwe Erichsen ed., 1995); and then citing JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 276 (1992)).
151 See Oster, supra note 132, at 1272.
152 See id. at 1275.
153 See id. at 1272, 1284.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL204.txt

2020]

unknown

CHEVRON

abroad

Seq: 23

8-DEC-20

9:33

643

while the German second step is most analogous to Chevron step zero by
focusing on delegation. The key difference between these delegation-based
inquiries is that the presumptions as to the legislature’s intent differ—prodelegation under Chevron and anti-delegation in the German doctrine. Notably, the German inquiry does not proceed to review the agency interpretation for reasonableness in a distinct step if courts decide that the agency has
delegated authority, but the overall reasonableness and agency explanation
likely figure into judicial review of the agency action under the margin-ofappreciation doctrine.154
One final aspect of the German approach is functionally similar to the
American “major-questions” doctrine.155 Germany’s comparatively stronger
nondelegation doctrine, as compared to its American counterpart, requires
the legislature to decide “basic questions itself” and “not delegate them to
the executive.”156 Together, strong nondelegation principles and the basicquestions doctrine limit when an agency can lawfully create its own interpretation. The American “major-questions” doctrine, although not framed as a
nondelegation doctrine,157 creates a strong presumption that Congress
would not delegate matters of “deep ‘economic and political’ ” significance to
agencies, whether or not it can do so.158 The major difference between the
German and American versions is that the former would require the legislature to decide the great matters in the first instance, while the American
version would allow the courts to interpret the statute at issue without Chevron deference.

154 See Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 75; id. at 77 (noting that the German legislature cannot give agencies the “conclusive” decisional authority).
155 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. The major-questions doctrine is an
amalgamation of several Supreme Court cases suggesting that the Court will not defer to
an agency’s interpretation if that interpretation involves questions of “such economic and
political magnitude” that Congress likely did not implicitly delegate authority to the agency
to resolve the issue. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000); see also VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10204, DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: WILL THE SUPREME COURT OVERRULE CHEVRON? 2–3 (2018)
(“The major questions doctrine, while never endorsed by name by the Supreme Court, has
been distilled from a number of cases in which the Supreme Court suggested that it would
not defer to an agency’s interpretation under Chevron . . . .”).
156 Oster, supra note 132, at 1290.
157 In a recent dissent, Justice Gorsuch identified the major-questions doctrine as a tool
for enforcing “the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative
power by transferring that power to an executive agency.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S.
Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Kavanaugh has indicated that he
supports a form of the major-questions doctrine that requires Congress either to decide
major questions or delegate them to agencies expressly. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct.
342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
158 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).
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Angst Italian Style

Italy provides an example of a nonfederal, civil-law constitutional republic.159 Similar to Germany, it has a parliamentary system with express separation-of-powers principles in its Constitution.160 Indeed, Professor John
Merryman noted decades ago that separation of powers is “more sharply conceived in Italy than in common-law countries,”161 at least as between the judicial and executive.162 This separation encourages Italian courts to refrain
from ordering specific policy mandates in the face of unlawful administrative
conduct,163 similar in nature to American Chenery I doctrine.164 The Italian
Constitution also provides constitutional authority to two identified agencies
(the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato) and the Court of Auditors (Corte dei
conti)),165 and the country has created other independent regulatory
agencies.166
Italy’s judges have protection from at-will removal through removal proceedings from within the judiciary for most judges.167 The Italian administrative review via administrative courts terminates in the Consiglio di Stato, a
council that is both an administrative court and government advisor.168 The
159 Although Italy does not have a formal federalist system, it has a long history of
regional autonomy, especially for five particular regions, and “has delineated a system
characterized by the decentralization of the power more similar to the United States model
than the German one.” Nerio Marino, The New Institutional Italian Organization: The Federalism: The Experience of Other European States and the U.S. System, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 353, 354
(2002); see also CONSTITUZIONE [COST.] art. 5 (It.) (“The Republic . . . recognises and promotes local autonomies, and shall implement the fullest measure of administrative decentralisation in the services which depend on the State. The Republic shall adapt the
principles and methods of law-making to the requirements of autonomy and decentralisation.”); id. art. 117(s). See generally, Carlo Dapelo, The Trends Towards Federalism in Italy, 15
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 345 (2002) (discussing increased desire for a more federalist system
within Italy).
160 See, e.g., COST. arts. 104, 135, 136.
161 John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style I: Doctrine, 18 STAN. L. REV. 39, 47 (1965).
162 The separation between the executive and legislative branches is weaker. See Christopher L. Henry, Italy, Mexico, and the Legal Framework for Clientelism, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. 1, 14 (2015).
163 See Vera Parisio, The Italian Administrative Procedure Act and Public Authorities’ Silence,
36 HAMLINE L. REV. 3, 14 (2013).
164 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943) (requiring courts to
uphold agency action only on the grounds upon which the agency based its action).
165 See COST. art. 100.
166 See Eduardo Jordão & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review of Executive Policymaking
in Advanced Democracies: Beyond Rights Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 70 (2014). Italian law
requires independent agencies only to engage in notice and comment proceedings, as a
way to compensate for the lack of independent agencies’ political accountability. See id. at
71.
167 See COST. art. 107.
168 See Marco D’Alberti, Transformations of Administrative Law: Italy from a Comparative
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 102, 109 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L.
Lindseth & Blake Emerson eds., 2017) (“The judicial functions of the Italian Council of
State had a weak start, but since the first decade of the twentieth century its judicial review
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Council’s advisory arm opines on administrative regulations and functions
somewhat like the United States Office of Management and Budget.169 Its
judicial wing houses administrative courts that are responsible for much of
the caselaw that deals with judicial review of administrative action.170 Unlike
American courts, Italian courts will virtually never review agency rules. But
they do review agency adjudications.171
Over the recent past, judicial review of agency statutory interpretation in
Italy has fluctuated wildly.172 Historically, Italian courts provided more limited review for discretionary agency decisions and more intensive review for
nondiscretionary agency decisions.173 Discretionary decisions (discrezionalità
amministrativa) are those that require the agency to evaluate competing interests, including the agency’s primary purpose and secondary public and private interests.174 For discretionary decisions, the courts’ limited review is for
reasonableness and proportionality.175 Two notable commentators likened
the review of discretionary decisions to Chevron’s second step,176 which in
turn is often similar to arbitrary-and-capricious review under the APA that
considers whether agencies weighed appropriate considerations in their decisionmaking. If no comparative evaluation exists as part of an agency decigained more intensity . . . .”); Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 23 & n.69; see
also Douglas L. Parker, Standing to Litigate “Abstract Social Interests” in the United States and
Italy: Reexamining “Injury in Fact,” 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 273 (1995) (“The Italian
courts can generally be divided into two types: administrative and ordinary courts. The
administrative courts, acting through Regional Administrative Tribunals (tribunali amministrativi regionali, or ‘TARs’) and an appellate tribunal, the Council of State (consiglio di stato),
have jurisdiction over cases seeking nullification of governmental actions alleged to be
unlawful. The ‘ordinary’ courts have jurisdiction over most other cases, including those in
which a monetary remedy against the government is sought.” (footnote omitted)).
169 See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Essay, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PITT.
L. REV. 935, 989 (1982).
170 See id. Historically, administrative courts had a role only when agencies invaded
individual rights. If agencies had discretion, however, the courts viewed the agencies as
having rights, usually to the exclusion of individuals. See Franco Gaetano Scoca, Administrative Justice in Italy: Origins and Evolution, 2 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 118, 124–25 (2009). Current
doctrine recognizes the ability for administrative courts to declare when an administrative
action violates law or exceeds the agency’s authority. See id. at 125.
171 See Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 23. In what may seem strange to
American eyes, Italy’s constitutional court can review statutes, but not regulations. See id.
at 24. The absence of review over regulations seems especially problematic in light of
Italy’s longstanding concern over bureaucratic corruption, which the government has only
partially mitigated. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 1, at 65.
172 See Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 23.
173 Id. at 24.
174 See id. at 27; Daria de Pretis, Italian Administrative Law Under the Influence of European
Law, 1 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 6, 41 (2010); see also D’Alberti, supra note 168, at 109 (“In many
cases the Council of State annulled administrative measures that do not pursue the public
purpose provided for by the law.”).
175 See de Pretis, supra note 174, at 41.
176 Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 27 n.91.
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sion, courts will impose some form of stronger review for agencies’ “fixed
powers” (or “nondiscretionary powers”).177
But Italian deference became significantly more complicated and confusing once courts recognized that certain agency decisions did not fit within
the existing discretionary/nondiscretionary binary framework.178 The Italian courts responded to this new category of agency decisions in a manner
reminiscent of Chevron. Traditionally, Italian courts afforded no deference
to agency construction of “ambiguous statutory terms.”179 However, courts
developed the concept of “technical discretion” (discrezionalità tecnica) toward
the end of the twentieth century to describe when an agency was interpreting
ambiguous legislative terms.180 Cases involving this technical discretion were
subject to a limited judicial review “on the basis that the administration has a
reserved power of technical evaluation.”181 For example, the Consiglio di
Stato deferred to agency determinations of whether certain buildings were of
“particular historical or artistic interest”182 and whether an advertisement
was “dangerous.”183 When reviewing matters of technical discretion, administrative courts originally could not call for expert assistance from the agency
and thus could not meaningfully review the technical basis for the agency’s
choices.184 Although the restriction on calling experts was later lifted,185
scholars had long been critical of the concept of technical discretion because
those agency decisions did not involve the comparative evaluation of interests. Instead, those decisions concerned only the evaluation of one interest—e.g., historical interest or dangerousness.186 Toward the end of the
twentieth century, the Consiglio recognized that it had acted inconsistently,
only sometimes applying deferential review to matters of technical
discretion.187
In cases from 2001 and 2002, the Consiglio sought to clarify its confusing
jurisprudence. Courts were to use “weak review” (sindacato debole)—that is,
177 See de Pretis, supra note 174, at 41.
178 See id. at 42.
179 See Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 25; see also Daniel A. Farber, The
Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 513,
518 (1996) (reviewing INTERPRETING STATUTES (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers
eds., 1991)) (noting that Italy gives “no deference at all” to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute).
180 See Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 25 (describing this shift from no
deference to technical discretion).
181 de Pretis, supra note 174, at 42.
182 See Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 25 (citing Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 12
dicembre 1992, n. 1055).
183 See id. (citing Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 30 novembre 1992, n. 986).
184 See de Pretis, supra note 174, at 42.
185 Id.
186 See Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 25 (citing Paolo Lazzara, ‘Discrezionalità tecnica’ e situazioni giuridiche soggettive, 2000 DIRITTO PROCESSUALE AMMINISTRATIVO 182,
212–15).
187 See id. (noting that the Consiglio di Stato recognized its departure from deferential
review in a decision from 1999 but shortly thereafter returned to only limited review).
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consider the reasonableness and coherence of the agency’s decision—when
agencies intertwined technical decisions with “real administrative discretion,”
meaning the comparative evaluation of interests.188 Under this regime,
courts could use strong review for pure technical discretion, but reverted to
the traditional “weak review” when technical and administrative discretion
were mixed together, a concept termed “complex technical assessments”
(valutazione tecniche complesse).189 (The concept of complex technical discretion echoes the German concept of margin of appreciation.)190 Notably, the
courts’ inquiry in determining in which category—technical discretion or
complex technical discretion—an agency decision belonged recalled Chevron’s step-zero focus on delegation and expertise.191
Only a couple of years later, in 2004, the Consiglio changed course once
again. Claiming that its reference to weak review had become misconstrued,
it stopped using weak review and turned to “full and particularly penetrating”
review in cases concerning complex technical assessments (also called “indeterminate legal concepts”).192 In other words, agency interpretations or
decisions that previously received deference now call for nondeferential
review. The agencies’ institutional, expert advantage previously justified judicial deference, but now Italian courts view agencies’ positions as insulated
from the political arena and thus deserving of stringent review.193 But why
this insulation exists (or has just come to exist) is unclear. Two scholars have
criticized the Consiglio for providing “no justification for its new stringent
review” or even acknowledging that it was changing course.194 Regardless of
the current doctrine’s normative support, Italian administrative law has come
to rest in an interesting place: agency interpretations of “intermediate legal
concepts” via rulemaking are essentially immune from judicial review, while
similar agency interpretations via adjudication are subject to strong judicial
review.195
Italian judicial review’s hesitant development demonstrates angst over
the appropriate nature of judicial review similar to the angst that has come to
pervade American judicial review. In two recent periods of Italian judicial
188 Id. at 26 (quoting Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 23 aprile 2002, n. 2199, item 1.3.1) (emphasis
in original).
189 Id. (“Examples are the evaluations performed by the antitrust agency when it interpreted and applied indeterminate legal concepts, such as ‘relevant market’ and ‘abuse of
dominant position.’”).
190 See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.
191 Cf. Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 27 (“Italian law [came] closer to
American and Canadian practice.”).
192 Id. at 26 (citing Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 3 febbraio 2005, n. 280; Cons. Stato, sez. iv, 8
febbraio 2007, n. 515; Cons. Stato, sez. vi, 17 dicembre 2007, n. 6469).
193 See Jordão & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 166, at 26–27 (“Whereas the Consiglio di
Stato previously highlighted the agencies’ institutional positions to suggest the need for
judicial deference, it now states that a full review is needed because independent agencies
are insulated from the political arena (fuori del circuito dell’indirizzo politico).”).
194 See id. at 27.
195 See id. at 29.

R
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review, the courts acknowledged the apparent need for deference, justified
by the agency’s expertise in interpreting indefinite legal terms. The Italian
deference regime during those periods was significantly similar to Chevron,
except that the Italian version relied more explicitly on expertise and had a
narrower domain than Chevron. The subsequent frustration with this weak
review system and reversion to stronger review mirrors the current debates in
American law over both keeping agencies within the bounds of their statutory charge with a stronger step one and allowing institutions with technical
and policy expertise a policymaking space. Although Chevron has continued
to maintain a place in American judicial review, Italian courts have eschewed
its analogue, adopting the position that is closer to that of Chevron’s detractors. Nevertheless, confusion remains. The Consiglio continues to use terms
associated with deference (at least nominally) in its strong review.196 If
recent history is any guide, the Consiglio’s deference-based rhetoric indicates
that the debate over Italian judicial review of agencies’ legal interpretations is
far from settled.
B.

Common-Law Countries

Although our investigation of two major civil-law countries is informative, our study of three common-law countries may prove more instructive for
debates surrounding Chevron because of the United States’ common-law system and heritage. Perhaps the most interesting discovery from our study is
that the common-law countries evidence more diversity than the civil-law
countries. Canada takes an approach similar to Chevron, while the United
Kingdom and Australia eschew it, save in limited contexts.
1.

United Kingdom and De Novo Review

Like the German and Italian governments, the United Kingdom has a
parliamentary system.197 But the UK, lacking a written constitution,198 does
not have the strong separation of powers protections or federal system that
exists within the United States and Germany. The UK does have longstanding informal separation of powers norms, as Lord Mustill discussed when dissenting in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Fire Brigades
Union:
Parliament, the executive and the courts have each their distinct and largely
exclusive domain. Parliament has a legally unchallengeable right to make
whatever laws it thinks right. The executive carries on the administration of
the country in accordance with the powers conferred on it by law. The
196 Cf. id. at 28 n.93 (describing how even in the current era of more stringent review,
courts still use “the discourse of the deferential era”).
197 Goldsmith, Keynote Address, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1155, 1156–57 (2007).
198 See id. at 1155. The only two other countries without a written constitution are
Israel and New Zealand. See The Justice System and the Constitution, CTS. & TRIBS. JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-constitution/jud-acc-ind/justice-sys-and-constitution/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
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courts interpret the laws, and see that they are obeyed. This requires the
courts on occasion to step into the territory which belongs to the executive,
to verify not only that the powers asserted accord with the substantive law
created by Parliament but also that the manner in which they are exercised
conforms with the standards of fairness which Parliament must have
intended.199

Lord Mustill recognized that the lack of a written constitution has required
the branches to be sensitive to one another to maintain a delicate, albeit
successful, equilibrium.200 Of course, as a parliamentary system without a
written constitution, no formal separation exists between the executive and
the legislature,201 even if the executive branch is a “principal organ[ ] of the
state.”202 UK ministers have no executive or administrative authority outside
of that provided by statute.203 But, as in the United States and Germany,
independent commissions or agencies do exist.204
Judges have the independent authority to interpret law and enforce
compliance with the law.205 To provide more separation between Parliament
and the judiciary than had existed for centuries, Parliament created the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in 2005 and transferred authority
from the Lord Chancellor (who is a member of the House of Lords and
member of the cabinet) to the Chief Justice, who is not in the House of
Lords.206 The judges on the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the
199 [1995] 2 AC 513 (HL) 567 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Mustill).
200 Id.
201 See Bignami, supra note 120, at 880–81.
202 René Reyes, Essay, Nondelegation Doctrine in Comparative Context: Britain’s Great Repeal
Bill and the Shadow of Henry VIII, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 74 (2017) (quoting R
(Miller) v. Sec’y of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61
(appeal taken from N. Ir.)). That said, although no formal nondelegation doctrine exists
in the UK, the government has expressed concern over legislative delegation via secondary
legislation. See generally Reyes, supra, at 74–75; Mark Tushnet, Constitution-Making: An Introduction, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1983, 2010 (2013) (noting British term of “secondary legislation”).
203 See Reyes, supra note 202, at 74.
204 See Michael S. Barr, Who’s in Charge of Global Finance?, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 1002
(2014) (discussing the UK’s independent agencies that govern financial regulation);
Bignami, supra note 120, at 882; Paul R. Verkuil, Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685, 706 (1986) (“Tribunals are the United Kingdom
equivalent to United States administrative agencies or, more precisely, to United States
independent agencies.”).
205 R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Ex parte Fire Brigades Union, [1995] 2 AC
513 (HL) 567 (Lord Mustill) (appeal taken from Eng.). Although the notion of parliamentary supremacy prohibits UK courts from invalidating laws of Parliament, see Monica A.
Fennell, Emergent Identity: A Comparative Analysis of the New Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 279, 295 (2008),
the lack of constitutional review under the UK’s legal system is not a meaningful difference
from the American system for our purposes here (to consider courts’ review of agency
interpretations of statutes or regulations).
206 See Fennell, supra note 205, at 281–82; Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4 (transferring authority from Lord Chancellor to Chief Justice and establishing the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom); The Justice System and the Constitution, supra note 198.
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Court of Appeal, the High Court, and the Crown Courts hold their positions
“during good behaviour,” are subject to removal only by impeachment,207
and cannot have their salaries reduced by Parliament.208 Similar to Congress’s authority within the American system,209 Parliament can preclude
judicial review of agency action through what are referred to as “privative
clauses,” although courts have often read them extremely narrowly.210 In
short, the UK has separation of powers traditions whose strength is growing,
but they do not have the positive constitutional status of the American, German, and Italian versions.
British courts use their discretionary power, derived from the common
law, to review administrative action for legal errors, including statutory interpretation.211 Prior to the late 1960s, courts, however, would substitute their
judgment for only jurisdictional errors of law (often through mandamus or
other writs),212 not nonjurisdictional ones, unless obvious on the face of the
record.213 Similar to Chevron, agencies had interpretative leeway to interpret
certain matters as long as those matters were nonjurisdictional.214 Yet
instead of grounding deference in notions of statutory clarity as Chevron
does, British deference distinguished between the nature of the agency
action—whether it concerned the agency’s ability to act in the first instance,
as compared to how the agency acted within its defined regulatory space.
The seemingly strict jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional dichotomy obscured

207 Senior Courts Act 1981, c. 54, pt. I, § 11(3) (concerning the Court of Appeal, the
High Court, and the Crown Courts); Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4, pt. 3, § 33 (concerning Supreme Court of the United Kingdom). The Act also contains provisions for
removing judges for medical disabilities, and that removal requires the assent of certain
other judges, depending on the judge whose removal is at issue. See Senior Courts Act
1981, c. 54, pt. I, §§ 11(8)–(9).
208 See Senior Courts Act 1981, c. 54, pt. I, § 12(3) (“Any salary payable under this
section may be increased, but not reduced, by a determination or further determination
under this section.”); Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4, pt. 3, § 34(3).
209 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018).
210 See Douglas E. Edlin, A Constitutional Right to Judicial Review: Access to Courts and
Ouster Clauses in England and the United States, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 67, 73–80 (2009).
211 Michael C. Tolley, Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation of Statutes: Deference Doctrines
in Comparative Perspective, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 421, 428 (2003) (“Error of law is the classic
ground of judicial review of administrative action.”). Although the APA recognizes jurisdictional errors as a ground for setting aside agency action, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), the
Supreme Court rejected the distinction in City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013).
212 See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Comp. Comm’n [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) 198–99
(appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Pearce).
213 See Paul Craig, Comparative Administrative Law and Political Structure, 37 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 946, 957 (2017).
214 See id. at 957–58 (describing how the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional dichotomy
allowed courts to maintain control over the administration while recognizing that some
issues were properly left to the administration).
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two competing lines of cases that called for narrower or broader understandings, respectively, of jurisdictional errors subject to judicial review.215
A new paradigm emerged in 1969 in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (Anisminic), where the question concerned how to interpret
the statutory term “successor in title.”216 Widely understood as adopting the
broader understanding of judicial review in one of the competing lines of
cases,217 Anisminic established that British courts are “the conclusive arbiters
on all questions of law.”218 The House of Lords in Anisminic extended jurisdictional error from earlier caselaw to include all legal errors.219 To preserve
legislative and democratic supremacy over government action, governing
statutes must bind agency decisionmakers.220 Decades later, R (Lumba) v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department confirmed the importance of Anisminic
by holding “that there [is] a single category of errors of law, all of which
render a decision ultra vires.”221 The Anisminic doctrine, accordingly, creates
a paradigm under which any error of law is subject to judicial review de
novo.222
Nonetheless, Lewans has noted how context can continue to limit judicial review of law, whereby review extends to “ordinary” matters but not “special” or “domestic” tribunals within a charitable institution for which they are
the “sole judge[s]” of the law.223 For instance, in R v. Hull University Visitor,
215 See LEWANS, supra note 103, at 49–58 (discussing “[d]eference as [s]ubmission” and
“correctness review” lines of caselaw and scholarship).
216 Anisminic, 2 AC 147.
217 See LEWANS, supra note 103, at 58 (noting, but questioning, the received view). In
comparison, leading scholars understood Chevron to adopt the narrower of two competing
forms of judicial review—Hearst’s reasonableness review over de novo review. See, e.g.,
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Essay, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations
of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 311 (1988); Strauss, supra note 10, at 1120–21.
218 Tolley, supra note 211, at 428.
219 See id. at 429. The legal issue in Anisminic was whether the former company owners
seeking compensation in a British tribunal for foreign sequestration of the company’s ore
had to demonstrate that they had no “successors in title” under the relevant international
agreement. See Anisminic, 2 AC at 173–74 (Lord Reid).
220 See id. at 194 (Lord Pearce) (“[T]ribunals must, however, confine themselves within
the powers specially committed to them on a true construction of the relevant Acts of
Parliament. It would lead to an absurd situation if a tribunal, having been given a circumscribed area of inquiry, carved out from the general jurisdiction of the courts, were entitled
of its own motion to extend that area by misconstruing the limits of its mandate to inquire
and decide as set out in the Act of Parliament.”); see also James Kane, Anisminic Error and
Discretion in Judicial Review, 16 HIBERNIAN L.J. 1, 7–8 (2017) (describing the importance of
Lord Pearce’s argument).
221 R (Lumba) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2011] UKSC 12, [66], [2012] 1 AC
245 (citing Boddington v. British Transp. Police [1999] 2 AC 143 (HL) 158D-E).
222 Anisiminic is similar to City of Arlington in that both the House of Lords and the U.S.
Supreme Court, respectively, rejected the jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional dichotomy. But
the rejection led to robust de novo review in the UK, while it led to robust Chevron space in
the United States. Our thanks to Jeff Pojanowski for this insight.
223 LEWANS, supra note 103, at 65 (quoting R v. Hull Univ. Visitor, Ex parte Page [1993]
AC 682 (HL) 702–03 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (holding that
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Ex parte Page, a university fired a senior lecturer for “redundancy.” When the
lecturer challenged his removal for lacking the statutorily required “good
cause,” the House of Lords refused to review the decision. Relying on precedent concerning judicial review of decisions by charities and of matters delegated to local courts (and not administrative agencies), the Lords
understood Parliament to have made the university the sole judge of whether
“good cause” existed.224 However, in Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s conclusion,
he stated that “[j]udicial review does lie . . . in cases where [the special or
domestic tribunal] has acted outside [its] jurisdiction (in the narrow sense)
or abused [its] powers or acted in breach of the rules of natural justice,”
suggesting some form of a revitalized jurisdictional/nonjurisdictional distinction when reviewing adjudications within charities, if not agencies more
broadly.225
In contrast to judicial review of legal issues, British courts are more deferential to agency policy decisions. Depending on the subject matter, courts
will use different degrees of deference.226 The default Wednesbury standard
calls for British courts to set aside agency determinations only when they are
“so unreasonable that no reasonable authority [after considering appropriate
factors] could ever have come to it.”227 But certain matters—such as those
that implicate human rights—receive more probing “proportionality”
review,228 while others—such as those dealing with state security—receive
university visitor could determine the “domestic” laws under which the university was
organized, including its laws for firing employees)).
224 Page, AC 682 at 702–03. Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that the general rule “that
decisions affected by errors of law made by tribunals or inferior courts can be quashed”
does not apply in the case of visitors because the visitor “is applying not the general law of
the land but a peculiar, domestic law of which he is the sole arbiter and of which the courts
have no cognisance.” If a visitor is acting within this narrow jurisdiction, then “he cannot
err in law in reaching this decision since the general law is not the applicable law” and thus
cannot be found to be acting ultra vires. Id. at 702.
225 Id. at 704.
226 See Robert C. Dolehide, Note, A Comparative “Hard Look” at Chevron: What the United
Kingdom and Australia Reveal About American Administrative Law, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1390
(2010) (“With respect to judicial review of administrative policy decisions in the United
Kingdom, the degree of deference differs based on the subject matter involved.”); see also
Tolley, supra note 211, at 430 (“In Britain, the scope of review that courts may exercise over
administrative action is broad and the intensity of review varies with subject matter.”).
227 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. [1947] 1 KB 223,
234 (Lord Greene MR).
228 See LEWANS, supra note 103, at 76–77 (referring to R (Daly) v. Sec’y of State for the
Home Dep’t [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC (HL) 532 (appeal taken from Eng.)). In our
view, the individual rights cases are often a mix of what American courts would frame as
statutory, constitutional, and policy questions. For instance, in Daly the House of Lords
held that an agency’s policy of excluding prisoners from the search of their privileged legal
communications violated their common-law right to confidential legal communications.
See Daly, 2 AC 532, 542. This would likely implicate the Sixth Amendment under American
law and thus be treated as a legal issue.
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nearly no review.229 Indeed, Lewans argues that British judicial review altogether has been “erratic,”230 yet has been moving “towards a contextual
approach.”231
With this summary of British law in mind, how does judicial review in
Britain compare to that in the United States? Instead of the American practice of giving agencies room to define ambiguous statutory terms reasonably,
the Anisminic decision treats all legal errors—whether or not they concern an
agency’s jurisdiction—the same and as subject to de novo review. As Page
(the decision concerning “good cause” removal of a lecturer) demonstrates,
British courts in practice exclude certain legal questions from their review.
Yet, even if American state and federal law might treat universities as agencies, one should not read too much into Page because the House of Lords
treated that case as one for its line of cases concerning charities or inferior
courts, not administrative agencies.232 Together Page and Anisminic ignore
ambiguity and reasonableness in favor of emphasizing judicial review or its
preclusion altogether.
Britain’s attempt to cleave legal questions from policy matters—with no
liminal space between those poles, à la Chevron step two—is consistent with
the Dicey dichotomy. By doing so, it creates judicial review that is similar to
the one that Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have suggested in which all legal
questions are for judicial review (with de novo or perhaps shaded by Skidmore
review).233 But even under this dichotomous approach, courts have left certain legal matters to agencies—those that include an individual’s rights in
adjudication concerning state security and (reminiscent of Chevron) even
statutory interpretation of “good cause” removal of university employees
based on parliamentary delegation to the university.
From a theoretical perspective, British judicial review is grounded in
notions that Parliament has delegated legal questions to the judiciary.234
The courts strongly presume that Parliament, despite having authority to preclude all judicial review, intends courts to keep agencies within their statutory

229 See generally R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Ex parte Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR
766 (noting that deportee’s right to respond to allegations had to cede to state’s security
interest).
230 LEWANS, supra note 103, at 86.
231 Id. at 87.
232 See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 273–74 (8th ed.
2000) (“In its latest decision [Page] the House of Lords has adopted Lord Diplock’s earlier
view, so that inferior courts must be distinguished from tribunals and other administrative
authorities. An error of law by an inferior court, therefore, may still give rise to an argument whether it is jurisdictional or not, and in the latter case it may be immune from
review.”).
233 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
234 See LEWANS, supra note 103, at 54, 70–71 (discussing scholarly views of judicial review
before and after Anisminic).
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strictures by ensuring that they comply with all legal requirements.235
Notions of expertise or uniformity have little-to-no place.236 Notably, under
the proposed Gorsuch-Thomas model for American law, legislative delegation would explain review of policy matters that Congress has delegated to
agencies. But it would not explain judicial review of legal issues because,
under their view, Article III compels judicial review, thereby not leaving any
discretion for legislative delegation to courts or agencies over legal matters.
Accordingly, the differences in governmental structure can lead to theoretical differences even with models that work similarly.
2.

Canada—Ever More American, Ever Less British

Although set within a common-law jurisdiction, Canada’s governmental
structure closely resembles Germany’s. Like Germany, it is a federation with
a written constitution.237 Its Constitution expressly creates legislative, executive, and judicial branches.238 Its separation of powers feels similar to, if perhaps a bit weaker than, that in the United States. For instance, the Canadian
Parliament has significant authority to delegate legislative-like authority to
agencies,239 but the executive cannot exceed its delegated authority.240
While the legislature can confer certain nonjudicial functions on the judiciary and adjudicative functions on the executive, it similarly cannot delegate
the “core powers” of the superior courts to inferior courts or administrative
tribunals.241 Finally, Canada, similar to the United States, has independent
agencies to assist Parliament in overseeing the executive.242
235 See Tolley, supra note 211, at 428 (“[T]he fundamental principle is that the courts
will intervene to ensure that the powers of administrative bodies are executed lawfully, that
is, on a correct legal interpretation of the statute.”).
236 For instance, “expertise” is mentioned only once in passing in all of the opinions in
Anisminic. See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Comp. Comm’n [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) 207
(appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Wilberforce).
237 See David Fontana, Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 189, 195
(2010); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). As
compared to the United States or Germany, Canada’s federation is the most decentralized,
allowing the provinces independent authority in commerce, labor, and immigration. See
Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 195, 214 (2000).
238 See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, pts. III, IV, VII (U.K.).
239 See Mark P. Mancini, Two Myths of Administrative Law, 9 W.J. LEGAL STUD. 1, no. 1,
2019, at 6; id. at 11 n.63 (noting that “an unexplored area of Canadian administrative law”
is whether there are limits on legislative delegation).
240 See John D. Richard, Separation of Powers: The Canadian Experience, 47 DUQ. L. REV.
731, 741 (2009).
241 Id. at 744.
242 See Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 531, 536 (2009). Canada also reformed its civil service to mix political accountability and nonpartisan expertise. See Thomas S. Axworthy & Herman B. Leonard, The Long
March in Hong Kong: Continuing Steps in the Transition from Colony to Democracy, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 555 (2007) (describing how Hong Kong has been moving closer to
the Canadian civil-service model).
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The judges of the Canadian Supreme Court243 and of lower superior
courts244 hold their offices during “good behaviour.” (Implicit constitutional
principles extend judicial independence—both actual and perceived—to all
Canadian judges.)245 The Supreme Court Justices also cannot hold any
other office or receive any other emolument during their tenure.246 The
Canadian courts have judicial review to declare acts of Parliament unconstitutional.247 The Federal Courts of Canada review federal administrative tribunals.248 Parliament cannot preclude all judicial review via privative (or
ouster) clauses, but their presence can limit judicial review to reasonableness
review.249
In 2008, the Canadian Supreme Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick provided a refined and detailed restatement to standards of review of agency
statutory interpretations. The Court was sensitive to balancing what are by
now two familiar values: preserving the rule of law and not overstepping into
the agencies’ delegated authority.250 To assume their proper role, Canadian
courts were to consider several factors, many of which echo the contextual
approach of the U.S. Supreme Court in King v. Burwell: the existence of a
privative clause, the agency’s purpose and expertise, and the nature of the
question at bar.251 Faced with a privative clause, courts were likely to apply
reasonableness review, instead of precluding review altogether.252 The more
discretely policy-oriented the agency’s mission and the more policy-oriented
the question at issue, the more likely the courts were to defer to the
agency.253 Even with questions of law, courts were likely to provide reasonableness review for those concerning the enabling or organic act. But for
legal issues that were “both of central importance to the legal system as a
whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise,” courts
would review de novo.254 Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent statement in the context of reviewing agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations,255 the Canadian Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts review
243 See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, § 9.1.
244 See Constitution Act, 1867, pt. VII, § 99, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 (U.K.).
245 See Richard, supra note 240, at 743.
246 See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, § 7.
247 See Richard, supra note 240, at 737.
248 See id. at 742.
249 See id. at 756.
250 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick (Bd. of Mgmt.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 27 (Can.)
(“Courts, while exercising their constitutional functions of judicial review, must be sensitive
not only to the need to uphold the rule of law, but also to the necessity of avoiding undue
interference with the discharge of administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures.”).
251 See Richard, supra note 240, at 756 (listing the factors that courts will consider in
determining the applicable degree of deference (citing Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
para. 461)).
252 See id.
253 See id.
254 See id. at 756–57 (quoting Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. para. 60).
255 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019).
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questions concerning the common law de novo.256 Unlike UK courts, Dunsmuir continued to engage in a jurisdiction/nonjurisdictional inquiry. The
Canadian Supreme Court clarified that jurisdictional questions are limited in
nature to whether or not the agency has “authority to decide a particular
matter.”257 In fact, the Court went out of its way to say that it did not seek to
return to the more capacious jurisdictional inquiries in its older jurisprudence.258 Later, the Court noted that jurisdictional questions “are narrow
and will be exceptional.”259 Instead of getting lost in nomenclature, the
Court instructed the lower courts that contextual inquiries determine standards of review.260
After Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court of Canada had sent mixed signals
about standards of review. As Lewans has discussed,261 the Court had pushed
for deference to apply to matters that Dunsmuir had indicated were inappropriate: matters related to common-law doctrines and even interpretations
that implicated constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech. For example, arbitrators in a labor-relations dispute had sufficient expertise to apply
common-law principles.262 And agency officials were institutionally superior
to courts in assessing contextual matters related to the legal interpretation in
the course of lawyer disciplinary proceedings concerning the lawyer’s communications with a judge.263 Nonetheless, in a decision concerning the
interpretation of an agency’s enabling act, and thus an area that appeared to
call for reasonableness review, the Court engaged in intensive statutory interpretation to rule, similar to Chevron, that the agency’s interpretation was
unreasonable because it was inconsistent with legislative intent.264
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada sought to provide more guidance
and consistency to judicial review in Canada v. Vavilov.265 In so doing, it
overruled strands of precedent. It clarified that reasonableness review
applies by default when the legislature has entrusted an agency to administer
a statute266—much like the seemingly broad domain for deferential review
256 See Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. para. 60.
257 See id. para. 59.
258 See id. The Court has recognized, however, that it has not identified a jurisdictional
question since it decided Dunsmuir. See Canada (Canadian Hum. Rts. Comm’n) v. Canada
(AG), [2018] 2 S.C.R. 230, paras. 35–37.
259 See Alberta (Info. & Privacy Comm’n) v. Alberta Tchrs.’ Ass’n, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654,
para. 39.
260 See Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. para. 64.
261 LEWANS, supra note 103, at 180–83.
262 See id. at 180–81 (citing Nor-Man Reg’l Health Auth. v. Manitoba Ass’n of Health
Care Pros., [2011] 3 S.C.R. 616, para. 44).
263 See id. at 181–82 (citing Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, paras. 47,
54).
264 See id. at 182 (citing Canada (Canadian Hum. Rts. Comm’n) v. Canada (AG),
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 471, paras. 33, 64).
265 See Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, para. 10.
266 See id. para. 7.
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that Chevron announced.267 The presumption is now clearly grounded solely
on notions of legislative delegation,268 and expertise is now germane only to
the reasonableness review itself, not the question of whether the presumption applies at all.269 The presumption can be overcome, however, in the
following circumstances. First, de novo review applies when the legislature
has indicated that it wants another standard of review to apply by either saying so or expressly granting judicial review of administrative decisions.270
Second, de novo review is required for certain questions, including constitutional questions, questions of “central importance to the legal system as a
whole” whose answers require consistent answers, and questions concerning
the jurisdictional boundaries between agencies.271 The Court confirmed
that it “depart[ed] from [its] recent jurisprudence” by inferring that an
express statutory right of judicial review indicates a legislative preference for
de novo review.272 The Court, favorably quoting City of Arlington, also
rejected the distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions (at least when not considering the jurisdictional disputes between agencies) that it had narrowly preserved in Dunsmuir.273
Canada’s reasonableness review asks whether the agency’s interpretation
“falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes.”274 But it also concerns itself with the agency’s “justification, transparency and intelligibility.”275 The Canadian Supreme Court has stated that reasonableness review,
like Chevron, recognizes that a statutory provision may have more than one
valid interpretation.276 And, like Chevron, the Canadian Supreme Court has
recognized that legal and factual matters are often intertwined.277 Finally,
the Canadian Supreme Court’s focus on substantive reasonableness and
transparent reason-giving echo the U.S. Supreme Court’s professed collapse
of Chevron step two with APA arbitrary-and-capricious review.278
The Canadian version of reasonableness review, with its numerous considerations,279 does not lack complexity. Nevertheless, Canada’s use of one
267 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)
(stating that Chevron steps apply “[w]hen a court reviews an agency’s construction of the
statute which it administers”).
268 See Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 para. 17.
269 Id. paras. 30–31.
270 Id. para. 17.
271 Id.
272 Id. paras. 38–39.
273 Id. paras. 67–68 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013)).
274 See Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick (Bd. of Mgmt.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 47.
275 See id.
276 See id. para. 41.
277 See id. para. 54.
278 See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011).
279 See Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65,
paras. 99–142 (describing various considerations for reasonableness review, including
coherent reasoning, legal and factual restraints, precedent, reason-giving, and procedural
fairness).
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reasonableness review standard provides some simplicity over the competing
American versions.280 The Dunsmuir Court treated factual, legal, and policy
matters as all equally worthy of the same kind of reasonableness review,281
despite a concurring opinion that called for stricter separation.282 American
standards of review under the APA, in contrast, differ based on the nature of
the issue and the agency’s method of deciding the matter under review.283
Moreover, Dunsmuir also reduced reasonableness review, as a matter of doctrine, to one intensity of analysis (reasonableness simpliciter), although the
Supreme Court’s review may differ sub silentio based on the reviewed issue.284
The American version in the context of discretionary policy decisions vacillates between “hard look” and “soft glance” review, depending on context.285
Canada’s standards of review for legal issues are similar in part to American forms. Like its American counterpart, Canadian jurisprudence recognizes a de novo and deferential review. Like Chevron deference, too,
reasonableness review in Canada is primarily premised on legislative delegation.286 Moreover, both jurisdictions carve out de novo review for matters
that do not implicate expertise (such as “major questions” for Chevron, or
widely applicable legal issues under Canadian practice). Both also have a
“step zero” to determine what kind of deference applies, and both have
inquiries that have grown increasingly categorical by considering the nature
of agency action or major questions in the United States, on the one hand, or
the presence of a statutory right of review in Canada, on the other hand.
Moreover, with the Canadian Supreme Court’s doctrinal change that recognizes statutory rights of review as signaling de novo review, reasonable
review’s domain has diminished, much like Chevron’s after Mead. That said,
Chevron has a pronounced role for determining whether ambiguity exists and
the manner by which the agency provides its interpretation. The Canadian
280 Id. para. 89 (“Despite this diversity [of decisions in which policy or law could
predominate], reasonableness remains a single standard, and elements of a decision’s context do not modulate the standard or the degree of scrutiny by the reviewing court.”).
281 See Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. para. 53.
282 See id. para. 158 (Deschamps, J., concurring) (“Any review starts with the identification of the questions at issue as questions of law, questions of fact or questions of mixed
fact and law.”).
283 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (providing different forms of judicial review); see also,
e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 474–92 (1951) (discussing use of “substantial evidence” inquiry in context of factual determinations in “on the record” adjudications); Herz, supra note 106, at 1884 (noting that Chevron applies to statutory
interpretation, while arbitrary-and-capricious review applies to other matters).
284 LEWANS, supra note 103, at 182 (citing Alberta (Info. & Privacy Comm’n) v. Alberta
Tchrs.’ Ass’n, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654, for the proposition that the court instructed lower courts
to consider reasons that the agency did not offer under deferential review, despite Dunsmuir’s focus on agency transparency and reason-giving).
285 See Barnett, supra note 40, at 61–62 (discussing difference uses of “hard look” and
“soft glance” review).
286 See Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65,
paras. 29–30 (noting proffered rationales—including expertise, efficiency, responsiveness
to stakeholders—but concluding that delegation is the reason for reasonableness review).
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approach, however, has no express inquiry into ambiguity or manner of
agency action. Instead, it focuses on reason-giving,287 substantive reasonableness,288 and the overall context surrounding the decision.289 Finally,
although American doctrine has been moving away from reasonableness
review, Canadian doctrine has reaffirmed reasonableness review while narrowing its domain.
3.

Australia and Anti-Chevron

For our final country in our tour of the world in eighty paragraphs or so,
we conclude with Australia. The Australian governmental model follows the
federal, parliamentary system with constitutional separation of powers that
we have encountered in Germany and Canada.290 Similar to those countries,
the Australian judiciary stands as a distinct branch, despite the blurred line
between the parliamentary executive and legislature.291 Section 71 of the
Constitution vests the judicial power in the High Court of Australia, federal
courts that the Federal Parliament creates, and “such other courts as it invests
with federal jurisdiction.”292 Section 75(v) confers on the High Court original jurisdiction to undertake judicial review of executive action, through
hearing claims for mandamus, prohibition, or injunctions against Commonwealth Officers.293 The judges of the High Court and other federal courts
are constitutionally protected by the guarantee of security of tenure and
remuneration.294 When interpreting statutes, the High Court adheres to the
principle set out in Marbury v. Madison, that it is “emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”295 Based on the
Marbury standard, Australian courts have found that the duty of the judiciary
extends to “judicial review of administrative action alleged to go beyond the
287 See id. paras. 77–81
288 See id. para. 83.
289 See id. para. 89.
290 Infosheet 20—The Australian System of Government, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., https://
www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/Powers_practice_and_procedure/00_-_Infosheets/Infosheet_20_-_The_Australian_system_of_government (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
291 See Bednar & Marchevsky, supra note 6, at 1065; Infosheet 20—The Australian System of
Government, supra note 290 (describing the Westminster-style of government).
292 Australian Constitution s 71.
293 Id. s 75(v). This constitutional provision of original jurisdiction is entrenched in
Australia and, as discussed below, has greatly influenced the lack of deference within the
country. See Mark Aronson, Between Form and Substance: Minimising Judicial Scrutiny of Executive Action, 45 FED. L. REV. 519, 519 (2017) (describing judicial review by the High Court as
“here to stay” and a “self-evident” truth); Jacob Waller, Gone but Not Forgotten: In Defence of
Hickman, 46 FED. L. REV. 259, 259 (2018).
294 Australian Constitution s 72(ii)–(iii); see also H.P. Lee & Michael Adams, Defining
Characteristics of ‘Judicial Power’ and ‘Court’—Global Lessons from Australia, 21 ASIA PAC. L. REV.
167, 171 (2013) (describing the Australian separation of powers and the judiciary).
295 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Bednar & Marchevsky, supra note 6, at 1063.
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power conferred by statute or by the prerogative or alleged to be otherwise in
disconformity with the law.”296
When reviewing agency policy choices, Australian courts review only for
legality and do not generally extend their gaze to the merits.297 Australian
High Court Justice Ronald Sackville has noted that “it is for the courts and
not the executive to interpret and apply the law, including the statutes governing the power of the executive.”298 Although “executive decision-makers
must ascertain the law insofar as it bears on the particular [executive] decision,” the decisionmakers’ “view as to the meaning of the legislation governing their powers and functions counts for nothing as far as the courts are
concerned.”299 De novo judicial review applies even to interpretations that
concern technical or economic considerations and even when agencies have
an institutional advantage in interpreting the language at issue.300
Given the Australian courts’ Dicean dichotomy between legal interpretations and policy decisions, it is not surprising that the Australian High Court
explicitly rejected Chevron in dicta in City of Enfield v. Development Assessment
Commission.301 In that case, a waste-management company applied to the
Development Assessment Commission (DAC) in South Australia for approval
to alter a waste-treatment plant located within the city of Enfield. The legal
question concerned whether the plant was a “special industry” that would
produce noxious fumes.302 If so, certain city-council consent was required.
But if it were a “general industry,” it would not require city-council consent.
The DAC found that the plant was a general industry. But a reviewing court
originally heard evidence and reversed the DAC’s determination.303 The full
court on review, however, reinstated the DAC’s decision, holding that it
could not reach the merits.304 On further appeal, the High Court of Australia agreed with the original judicial decision that the plant was “special indus-

296 A-G (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 35 (Brennan, J., concurring).
297 See Dolehide, supra note 226, at 1390 (“With respect to administrators’ policy
choices, review by Australian courts does not extend to the ‘merits’ of the administrators’
decisions.”); Ronald Sackville, The Limits of Judicial Review of Executive Action—Some Comparisons Between Australia and the United States, 28 FED. L. REV. 315, 321 (2000) (“[C]ourts are
not concerned with the merits of administrative decisions, but only with their legality.”).
Courts will narrowly review for unreasonableness or extreme lack of proportionality. See id.
at 322; see also Margaret Allars, Chevron in Australia: A Duplicitous Rejection, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 569, 576 (2002) (discussing very limited forms of merits review). Parliament has used
privative clauses to limit judicial review, most notably in for matters concerning migration.
See id. at 579.
298 Sackville, supra note 297, at 315–16.
299 Id. at 322.
300 See id. at 322–23.
301 City of Enfield v Dev. Assessment Comm’n (2000) 199 CLR 135.
302 See id. at 139–42.
303 Id. at 143.
304 Id. at 147–48.
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try” and held that the plant’s status was a jurisdictional fact for the court to
review.305
In its opinion, the High Court rejected Chevron deference in dicta. The
court reiterated U.S. Supreme Court Justice Breyer’s fear that Chevron would
result in “a greater abdication of judicial responsibility to interpret the law
than seems wise, from either a jurisprudential or an administrative perspective.”306 Australian Professor Margaret Allars describes the reasons for Australia’s rejection of Chevron as “threefold.”307 First, Chevron was not
necessarily applicable to the issue in City of Enfield, as it concerned “the role
of the court in determining the existence of a jurisdictional fact which was a
precondition to the jurisdiction of the agency,” similar to the analysis used by
UK courts, not the reasonableness of an interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.308 Second, the High Court was concerned that Chevron may
encourage agencies to interpret the statutory provision to reach desired outcomes, not interpret provisions with neutral interpretive tools.309 Third,
Chevron stood in stark contrast to the notions of Australian judicial review
noted above, that it is the role of the court to declare and enforce the law.310
Although Australia is the only country in our comparative study to reject
Chevron explicitly (albeit in dicta), the High Court in City of Enfield nonetheless noted the difficulty in determining whether a question at issue is one of
law or fact.311 In what Allars has dubbed the “expertise test,” the High Court
will “attach great weight” to agency determinations of whether facts fall
within a settled legal interpretation.312 What has thus resulted in Australia in
the wake of City of Enfield is akin to Skidmore deference in the United States—
a case that concerned an agency’s determination of whether certain circumstances of employment entitled employees to overtime.313 Australian High
305 See id. at 154–55; see also Allars, supra note 297, at 581–83 (describing facts and
procedural posture).
306 City of Enfield, 199 CLR at 152 (quoting Breyer, supra note 21, at 381).
307 Allars, supra note 297, at 583.
308 Id. at 583–84. Other Australian legal scholars and Australian High Court Justice
Stephen Gageler have agreed that Chevron “would not extend” to the question of deference to a factual or mixed fact issue in City of Enfield. See Stephen Gageler, Deference, 22
AUSTRALIAN J. ADMIN. L. 151, 155 (2015).
309 Allars, supra note 297, at 584.
310 Id. at 585; see also Tolley, supra note 211, at 428 (“Implicit in the Australian
approach, reiterated in Enfield, is the assumption that courts are responsible for all questions of law.”).
311 City of Enfield, 199 CLR at 154; see also Allars, supra note 297, at 586 (“The joint
judgment focussed upon one vexed area of operation of the distinction: where it is difficult
to distinguish between a question of law and a question of fact.”).
312 Allars, supra note 297, at 587 (quoting City of Enfield, 199 CLR at 154). Note, however, that the High Court has not been consistent in applying the expertise test to jurisdictional facts. Sometimes it has applied the expertise test, but other times it has applied the
so-called “accountability test.” As Allars convincingly explains, these two multifactor tests
overlap significantly, reducing the meaningfulness of which inquiry applies. See id. at
587–90.
313 See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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Court Justice Stephen Gageler has noted that Skidmore assists courts in statutory interpretation by “providing a body of expertise and informed judgment
to which courts can properly look for guidance.”314 While Chevron deference
does not comport with the Australian judicial view that courts independently
are responsible for declaring the law, Skidmore-style deference allows Australian courts to retain ultimate responsibility for interpretive decisions.315 Our
study does not tell us whether the High Court’s rejection of Chevron was a
symbolic move to establish judicial supremacy, all the while allowing a space
for agencies under Skidmore deference that operates similarly to Chevron.
Nonetheless, Australia has a doctrine that is Chevron-adjacent. The Hickman doctrine (from R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox)316 applies when two statutory
provisions exist: one that grants limited jurisdiction to an agency or inferior
court and a second that limits the jurisdiction of a supervising court to review
when the agency or inferior court oversteps its jurisdiction.317 When these
two provisions exist together, courts retain the ability to keep agencies within
their jurisdiction and thus say what the law is. But they give the agencies
space to interpret a statutory provision, as Justice Gageler has stated, “within
the bounds of reasonableness.”318 This reasonableness review under Hickman does not prohibit, on the one hand, judicial review of an agency or tribunal’s “breaches of ‘imperative duties or inviolable limitations or
restraints.’ ”319 But it permits, on the other hand, only limited judicial review
for “cases of bad faith, or [for] decisions or orders wholly unrelated to the
governing law’s subject matter or powers.”320 These limitations on agency
discretion and judicial review sound in a combined Chevron steps one and
two, as opposed to de novo or Skidmore review. The justification for Hickman
deference sounds similar to that for Chevron deference: “expert” agencies
have institutional superiority over “generalist” judges, and courts must
respect the legislature’s delegation to the agency as a matter of constitutional
theory.321 Indeed, Chevron’s ancestor (NLRB v. Hearst)322 was the likely
inspiration for Hickman.323 Hickman, however, has had a limited domain in
314 Gageler, supra note 308, at 153; see also Bednar & Marchevsky, supra note 6, at 1064
(describing the use of Skidmore deference in Australia).
315 See Bednar & Marchevsky, supra note 6, at 1064.
316 (1945) 70 CLR 598.
317 See Gageler, supra note 308, at 154. For the varying nomenclature under Australian
law for agencies, see Allars, supra note 297, at 571 n.6. Those differences are not significant for purposes of this Article’s discussion.
318 Gageler, supra 308, at 155 (describing how the Hickman doctrine provided a “wellunderstood basis” for a reviewing court to approach these issues).
319 Aronson, supra note 293, at 522.
320 Id.
321 Ian Holloway, “A Bona Fide Attempt”: Chief Justice Sir Owen Dixon and the Policy of Deference to Administrative Expertise in the High Court of Australia, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 691
(2002) (citing Hickman, 70 C.L.R. at 617).
322 See supra notes 50–53and accompanying text.
323 Kingham, supra note 108, at 51.
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practice,324 with courts often using the doctrine to circumscribe agency
authority.325
Hickman has also likely assumed a more limited doctrinal and theoretical
space. Three years after Enfield’s rejection of Chevron, the High Court did
not purport to overturn Hickman in Plaintiff S157/2002 v. Commonwealth.326
Indeed, the High Court, although not considering the reasonableness of an
agency interpretation, relied upon Hickman in Plaintiff S157/2002 to adopt a
limited construction of a privative clause.327 Yet, the High Court sought to
place Hickman within the context of Australian judicial review and constitutional law328: Section 75(v) of the Australian Constitution (which provides
the High Court original jurisdiction over executive action and the ability to
issue common-law writs and injunctions) constitutes “textual reinforcement”
of the rule of law by “entrench[ing] minimum provision of judicial review”
for the High Court to correct jurisdictional error.329 In short, the Hickman
doctrine appears to continue as an authority for reading privative clauses narrowly, but the more recent caselaw does not expand on the discretion that
agencies have when Hickman applies. To be sure, Hickman has applied for
much of the twentieth century and continues today. Nonetheless, its
zenith—perhaps like Chevron’s—may have passed.330
III.

APPLYING LESSONS

FROM

ABROAD

Based on our review of other countries’ practices, we conclude that Chevron in its narrow form—something akin to a two-step process or with a similar
domain to Chevron—is not inevitable. But all of the countries exhibit at least
some continued anxiety over distinguishing legal matters from policy matters
(or sometimes, factual from legal matters) and thus respecting separate judicial and executive functions. Indeed, the reviewed countries have crafted
different doctrines to deal with this tension, yet actors within each often seem
324 See id. (“[T]here seems little scope for applying [Hickman after Enfield], at least
openly.”); Aronson, supra note 293, at 522 (“Hickman’s safe haven for privative clauses was
even more elusive than that, because it barred entry to cases involving breaches of ‘imperative duties or inviolable limitations or restraints’. As these were in the eye of the judicial
beholder, very few flawed administrative decisions ever made it into Hickman’s protected
waters.” (footnote omitted) (quoting R v Metal Trades Emps.’ Ass’n; Ex parte Amalgamated
Eng’g Union (1951) 82 CLR 208, 248 (Dixon, J.))).
325 See Gageler, supra note 308, at 154–55.
326 Fed. Comm’n of Tax’n v Futuris Corp. (2008) 237 CLR 146, 168 (Gummow, Hayne,
Heydon & Crennan, JJ.) (referring to Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR
476). In Futuris Corp., the plurality, among other things, held that a party could seek judicial review of claims that the agency did not administer the law in good faith, even if
another clause limited the review of certain other agency determinations. See Futuris Corp.,
237 CLR at 156–157, 166–167.
327 See Plaintiff S157/2002, 211 CLR at 489, 494, 500–501.
328 See Futuris Corp., 237 CLR at 168.
329 Plaintiff S157/2002, 211 CLR at 513; see also Aronson, supra note 293, at 522
(describing Plaintiff S157 in the context of the Hickman doctrine).
330 See Gageler, supra note 308, at 154–55.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL204.txt

664

unknown

Seq: 44

notre dame law review

8-DEC-20

9:33

[vol. 96:2

dissatisfied with the status quo. Their mostly shared concern over balancing
appropriate review of legal and policy questions suggests that these countries
will continue to generate caselaw on the appropriate nature of judicial
review. Their current and perhaps future approaches can provide guidance
on how to improve Chevron.
A.

Chevron’s Evitability

Gellhorn would be proud. Since the mid-twentieth century, all of our
studied legal systems have been working through what he referred to as the
“burning question”—how to balance rule of law with expert policymaking.331
For instance, despite briefly having a judicial review doctrine that permitted
deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions in the
1970s, Germany has moved to a more limited domain for agency discretion
over certain technical matters. The UK and Italy, for their part, also turned
from judicial review that gave agencies more discretion to judicial review that
significantly, if not entirely, limits deference. Australia has explicitly rejected
Chevron but retains (for now) a limited deference regime to respond to competing statutory provisions that together enlarge agency discretion and limit
judicial discretion. Canada, in contrast to the others, has a system that most
mirrors Chevron by providing deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations if courts find deference suitable after a multifactor, functional
inquiry.
Except perhaps in Germany and the UK, none of our studied countries
have appeared to settle if, when, and how to defer. Germany appears to have
decided upon a narrow margin-of-appreciation doctrine. British courts
review all questions of law. Although they continue to defer to certain matters for “special” or “domestic” tribunals within charities (including universities), that exception appears to arise from charity cases, not administrative
law. Italy also appears to have ruled out deference at first glance, but commenters have noted that the Consiglio di Stato still uses deferential language in
its opinions. And given its significant doctrinal convulsions over the past
thirty years, Italian courts do not inspire confidence that they have put questions over deference to rest. Australian courts have left their doctrine in a
similar spot. They have rejected Chevron in dicta, but they have not done so
as part of a decision’s holding, and they continue to have, at least officially,
the Hickman doctrine that defers to agency statutory interpretations. The
Canadian courts, unlike the others, appear most likely to expand the domain
for deference. But their application of the doctrine has appeared inconsistent: recall that they have deferred in common-law and constitutional matters
yet have refused to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its enabling act.
Based on our inquiry, American courts can feel relieved that they are not
alone afflicted with anxiety over judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. Instead, that anxiety is usually present, albeit in different degrees, in
other legal systems.
331

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Despite widely shared anxiety over judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation, our studied countries have responded to it, to varying
degrees, in different ways. On one end of the spectrum rests Italy, which has,
for now, banished deference doctrines. Germany, the UK, and Australia
have also relied primarily on de novo review, while carving out small and
often unclear niches for deferential or otherwise precluded review. Their
strong presumption in favor of de novo review and limited exceptions for
deference appear very similar to Pojanowski’s call for a stricter divide
between law and policy. Their niches, however, differ significantly. Germany’s is for narrow technical matters, the UK’s is for adjudications within
what its law defines as charitable institutions, and Australia’s is for statutory
schemes that limit judicial review for matters assigned to agencies. At the
other end of the spectrum sits Canada with its reaffirmed, default reasonableness review that, despite its new categorical limitations in Canada v. Vavilov,
continues to have a wide berth.
These studied countries have rested deference (or the lack thereof) on
two familiar theoretical concerns that ground Chevron. The Supreme Court
in Chevron grounded deference on legislative delegation and expertise, and
King v. Burwell connected the two grounds by suggesting that Congress would
not delegate interpretive matters to agencies that were outside the agencies’
expertise. Germany’s two-step margin-of-appreciation doctrine has the same
theoretical grounding. Recall that the German step one considers whether
the terms are within an agency’s expertise and concern certain technical matters like risk, and the German step two concerns explicit or implicit parliamentary delegation. Australia’s Hickman doctrine also relies on notions of
expert institutional advantage and joint statutory provisions to signal legislative delegation. The UK’s exception for “special tribunals” rests on only legislative delegation, not expertise. Likewise, Canada now rests deference on
only notions of legislative delegation, although the agency’s expertise can
influence the nature of the court’s reasonableness review. Italy, the only
studied country to eschew deference altogether as of late, no longer relies
upon agency expertise to defer under judicial review, but the Consiglio di
Stato has not explained why it has changed its mind. Despite these countries’
concern with delegation alone or delegation and expertise, two other
grounds for Chevron deference are noticeably absent: the benefits of political
accountability and uniformity.
Based on our comparative study, Chevron does not appear inevitable, at
least in its current two-step form or in its current scope. It is merely one
possible avenue of judicial review, despite that four of our five compared
countries have constitutional separation of powers, three have federalist systems, all identified at least one of the theoretical grounds for Chevron, and all
have confronted the tension between judicial control and agency discretion.
Although four of the compared countries have some form of deference,
three of those are much more limited in reach. Moreover, none of the four
countries use a similar two-step formulation that Chevron does. Instead of the
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key focus being on ambiguity, the inquiry primarily focuses on delegation
(Chevron’s step zero).
That said, the fact that four countries have some form of deference to
agency (or quasi-agency, in the case of British universities) legal interpretation indicates that Chevron’s concern over the border between law and policy
is not an aberration of judicial review that some in the United States or even
some in the foreign systems that we studied may suppose. Canada’s deference regime, in fact, is substantially similar to Chevron, even if the Canadian
and American versions differ in their particulars. Although one must do
more research and await future developments to determine whether
Canada’s new categorical approach to deference has a broader domain than
Chevron, the Canadian courts have appeared to extend deference’s domain
into areas (such as matters concerning constitutional or common-law rights)
in which Chevron would not have appeared to apply. Notably, because the
UK does not engage in a reasonableness inquiry once it has applied deference (at least directly or as a distinct step), its deference is more powerful
despite its small domain. The UK’s deference, in other words, is relatively
absolute (save other grounds for review, such as proportionality or constitutional review), as opposed to Chevron’s more limited form of deference. Even
Australia, whose High Court has expressly rejected Chevron, has a limited doctrine that seeks to accommodate legislative delegations with mere reasonableness review of agency statutory interpretation. The repeated appearance of
deference in some form suggests that it is likely to exist in mature judicialbureaucratic systems, even if its scope is much smaller than Chevron’s.
In fact, other countries’ experiences indicate that Dicey’s call for strict
separation between policy and law for purposes of judicial review may be only
aspirational or rarely achieved. Including the United States, five of the six
countries, to varying degrees, have all created some space for deferential
review of certain legal interpretations based on notions of legislative delegation and expertise. Only one has eschewed deference altogether for agency
statutory interpretation. But even that eschewal was fairly recent, showed
some rhetorical and theoretical strain, and arose only after a chaotic doctrinal journey.
Because none of the countries that we reviewed has a presidential system
like the United States, we cannot say whether other presidential systems
might or might not have deference similar to Chevron. Yet, as a theoretical
matter, it is not clear to us how the presence of a presidential system cuts.
Nicholas Bednar and Barbara Marchevsky, for instance, suggest Australia’s de
novo review is expected because of the country’s more unified executive and
legislature. They argue that the branches are less likely to disagree, and the
executive is likely to follow legislative preferences.332 Although Bednar and
Marchevsky do not say so expressly, their argument appears to be that de
novo review is, accordingly, not disruptive to the administrative state under a
parliamentary system. But if the branches are in agreement and the execu332

See Bednar & Marchevsky, supra note 6, at 1065–66.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-2\NDL204.txt

2020]

unknown

CHEVRON

abroad

Seq: 47

8-DEC-20

9:33

667

tive is unlikely to exceed legislative preferences, would deference not make
the most sense? Why should a court system waste its time with de novo review
when deviation from legislative intent is rare? At the same time, if America’s
peculiar brand of governmental branch competition—via separation of powers and checks and balances—leads the executive to jostle against the other
branches, should the judiciary push back with de novo review to keep the
executive in its place or, instead, defer to ensure that the judiciary does not
overstep its authority? Under either governmental system, we end up back
where Dicey and Gellhorn left us. Neither answer appears logically correct
or even more likely to follow as a pragmatic matter than the other.
Other countries’ experience suggests perhaps that Hickman and Bednar
may have overstated the inevitability of Chevron, or something similar to it.
Only one country—Canada—regularly employs a similar doctrine. But our
study neither speaks directly to Hickman and Bednar’s normative arguments
for Chevron nor undermines their concern that judges with de novo review
may well defer sub silentio to expert agency interpretation. Perhaps, however,
Hickman and Bednar should be understood to say that that some kind of
deference regime, even if substantially more limited in scope than Chevron, is
inevitable. If so, our findings indicate that Chevron—or something like it—is
at least ubiquitous. Of course, to the extent that one defines Chevron so
broadly as to mean nearly any room—no matter how rare or limited—for
deferential review of legal questions, one’s claim becomes less meaningful.
Likewise, our findings also do not appear largely consistent with
Vermeule’s abnegation theory because courts often eschew deference. If
anything, the story that we see in every studied country except Canada points
in the opposite direction. Indeed, even Canada has very recently taken a
more categorical approach to limiting the domain of reasonableness review
and thereby appeared to narrow its reach. Nonetheless, as with Hickman
and Bednar, we cannot say whether, in the absence of Chevron or some other
doctrine of similar domain, these other legal systems fill the void by adopting
more contextual inquiries or simply reframe legal issues as policy ones, over
which judicial review is at its nadir. Moreover, we cannot say whether largely
de novo review of legal matters leads courts to defer more to factual matters
(or for agencies to get more creative in factual findings rather than legal
ones) when judicial review is available.333 We can say only that we have not
found a similar phenomenon in judicial review of legal questions in the
countries that we have studied. Finally, of course, we cannot predict the
future. Many of these countries’ continued angst and tinkering may lead all
of these countries to adopt some form of Chevron-like review. But, based on
our review, that conclusion seems as likely as courts moving toward de novo
review or extremely limited deference domains.
333 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the
Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 53, 74–75 (“[W]hatever controls are exercised through judicial
review of questions of law can easily be circumvented by carefully contrived findings of
fact.”).
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Chevron’s Improvement

Our comparative study also helps us consider how to improve Chevron if
it continues. Some scholars have grown tired of the energy spent on determining whether Chevron applies. Some would end the doctrine altogether
because it has failed in its mission and is not worth the trouble of refashioning.334 One of them would leave the doctrine as it is—warts and all—at
least until more empirical evidence informs how those changes would affect
judicial review.335 Should the courts consider further refinements to Chevron, our comparative, qualitative study highlights the useful role that Chevron
can play and suggests certain simplifications to Chevron to bolster its theoretical grounding in expertise and delegation.
1.

Expertise

Chevron should continue focusing on agency expertise as a necessary
ground for deference, but it should also engage in a more probing and simplified inquiry. As our study indicates, expertise is a common basis for deference, even if limited, for good reason. Expertise is a necessary (yet
insufficient) ground for deference in a democratic system. As legal philosopher Joseph Raz suggested, one reasonably defers to authority, such as a physician, when one is usually better off taking instruction from one with more
knowledge, even if that authority errs occasionally.336 But if the putative
authority lacks expertise, the justification for deference fails.
Germany provides a guide for recognizing expertise’s place in deference
doctrine by focusing on certain technical terms and risk regulation as one
part of its two-step inquiry. Instead of opening up deferential review to
nearly all instances of statutory ambiguity, the German model applies deferential legal review only to certain, limited matters concerning economic or
natural science in the context of risk management. The American search for
ambiguity as to all statutory terms is, at best, an oblique way of discerning
legislative delegation. Even if it were an attempt to recognize agency expertise, ambiguity-based inquiries would be a capacious way of doing so. Merely
because an ambiguity arises in a statutory scheme that an agency administers
tells courts nothing of whether the agency has or uses expertise in its statutory interpretation.337 The German inquiry targets terms that concern certain scientific or economic concepts to render it more likely that the agency
has and uses its expertise as part of its interpretation. The main benefits of
the Teutonic approach are to tie judicial deference closely to administrative
334 See supra note 15.
335 See Nicholas R. Bednar, What to Do About Chevron—Nothing, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 151, 174–75 (2019).
336 See Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 3, 18–19 (1985).
337 Cf. Mancini, supra note 239, at 18 (criticizing the Canadian Supreme Court’s presumption that an agency has expertise whenever it interprets a matter in its organic or
other related statutes).
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expertise and to provide a more refined inquiry into comparative institutional competence as between courts and agencies.
Of course, the American model does not rely on ambiguity alone. At
Chevron step zero, courts consider whether the ambiguity arises under a statute that the agency administers, whether Congress has delegated to agencies
the ability to act with the force of law, whether the question concerns major
questions of political or economic import, and, occasionally, whether the
question concerns common-law interpretations or matters outside the
agency’s expertise. Notably, however, only the last of these considerations
directly concerns expertise. For this final factor, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on how lower courts are to tell whether a particular
matter falls within an agency’s expertise. In King v. Burwell, for example, the
Court simply announced that “the IRS . . . has no expertise in crafting [a]
health insurance policy of this sort,”338 despite one leading tax scholar’s
skepticism,339 when determining that Congress would not delegate to the
IRS the authority to define “an Exchange established by the State.”340 To the
extent that the American inquiry for deference considers expertise, expertise
has a small role, and the Court has provided little guidance on how to assess
agency expertise.
The German inquiry, to be sure, may have its own problems. The margin-of-appreciation doctrine applies only rarely, suggesting that the German
inquiry may be too limited. Relatedly, to the extent that it applies only to
scientific matters, it may not capture all of the ways in which agencies can
have expertise. Agencies may have expertise by repeated interactions with
certain factual scenarios (such as those surrounding tariffs), by administering
complicated statutory frameworks (such as tax), or by regulating technologically complex industries (such as telecommunications). Moreover, contrary
to some recent scholarly and judicial calls in the United States, some German
scholars argue that the margin-of-appreciation doctrine should have a more
expansive space.341 At the same time, Canada’s now-rejected open-ended,
multi-factor search for expertise likely went too far and provided little certainty to help the legislature know when expertise implied delegation.342
338 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (emphasis omitted).
339 See Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015
PEPP. L. REV. 56, 69–70 (discussing numerous areas, including health policy, where the IRS
interprets statutory provisions concerning tax expenditures).
340 King, 576 U.S. at 486 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012)).
341 See Arai-Takahashi, supra note 118, at 77, 80.
342 Canada now considers an agency’s expertise as part of its reasonableness review
itself, as opposed to whether to review for reasonableness in the first place. See Canada
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, para. 31 (“We wish to emphasize that because these reasons adopt a presumption of reasonableness as the starting
point, expertise is no longer relevant to a determination of the standard of review as it was
in the contextual analysis. However, we are not doing away with the role of expertise in
administrative decision making. This consideration is simply folded into the new starting
point and, as explained below, expertise remains a relevant consideration in conducting
reasonableness review.”). It is, of course, too early to know whether the agency’s interpre-
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A Chevron step-zero inquiry with a more defined focus on a broad understanding of expertise would not only provide additional clarity but ensure
that Chevron has a stronger relationship with one of its theoretical foundations. One path forward is to require that the ambiguous term be one of
scientific or technological complexity within the agency’s charge, or one that
rests within a complex statutory framework that the agency administers. To
be sure, whether a term concerns “technical complexity” or is of a “scientific”
nature is still a standard-based inquiry that will lead reasonable jurists to disagree in some cases. Likewise, adding a more specific expertise-focused
inquiry adds yet another step to ascertaining whether deference is appropriate. Yet even with these two limitations, an expertise-focused inquiry
strengthens two of Chevron’s theoretical foundations: it furthers uniformity by
clarifying what role expertise has in triggering Chevron deference, and it
grounds Chevron in expertise.
2.

Legislative Delegation

Chevron should require more evidence of legislative delegation. As with
expertise, our comparative study indicated that at least four of our five studied countries (all except Italy, which does not currently use deferential
review) relied on notions of legislative delegation in considering whether to
defer. The strong showing for delegations is not surprising because agencies
exercise legitimate authority in democratic systems only with lawful legislative
or constitutional delegation.343 Although these four countries, along with
the United States, have indicated concern over maintaining a meaningful
place for courts and judicial review as a whole, they have all permitted some
interpretive delegations to agencies. Most—Germany, the United States,
Australia, and Canada—generally presume a form of reasonableness review
with delegations, while others, like the UK, appear to permit precluded
review altogether.
Chevron’s inquiry (or lack thereof) for delegation has long been subject
to criticism.344 Because Congress almost never expressly addresses delegation in its statutory handiwork, American courts have turned to oblique ways
of deciphering implicit congressional intent. In the face of congressional
silence, American courts infer legislative delegation when the agency
administers the statute at issue,345 uses legislatively delegated authority to act
with the force of law when interpreting ambiguous statutory language,346 and
interprets something other than a major question of political or economic
tations will prevail more or less when expertise becomes germane to the reasonableness
inquiry, as opposed to the initial question of whether deference applies at all.
343 See LEWANS, supra note 103, at 194–96.
344 See, e.g., PAUL DALY, A THEORY OF DEFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BASIS, APPLICATION AND SCOPE 69 (2012) (arguing for “a holistic approach” to ascertaining legislative
delegation, as opposed to Chevron’s “blunt rule”).
345 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
346 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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importance.347 Some of these factors better ascertain delegation than
others.
First, consider the relationship between acting with the force of law and
interpretive primacy. In past work, one of us has joined those348 who question the relationship between delegated interpretive authority and delegated
authority to act with the force of law.349 Whether Congress wants an agency
to act with the force of law does not necessarily mean that courts should not
interpret statutory terms. Indeed, Congress has indicated that it is not the
ability to act with the force of law that matters to Congress but whether the
agency uses its expertise when interpreting statutory language. In one of the
only instances in which Congress has expressly legislated on interpretive delegation, it permitted the agency in question (the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency) to preempt state laws with the force of law, but it required
courts to apply Skidmore, not Chevron, deference to the agency’s preemption
determinations.350 Legislative history indicated that Congress did so because
it was displeased that regulated entities had captured the agency and thereby
led the agency not to use its expertise in preempting state law.351 Moreover,
even if the Supreme Court has properly linked force-of-law authority and
interpretive primacy, the determination of whether an agency has force-oflaw authority has proven complicated and inconsistent in practice.352
Next consider the relationship between interpretive primacy and the
interpreted statute. Whether the agency administers the statute at issue is a
simple, if not overly broad, way of identifying whether the agency has expertise in the matter. The Court assumes, as a default, that Congress intends
agencies to have interpretive authority over ambiguous provisions in the
agency’s administered statutes. Notably, however, this inquiry really gets at
comparative agency expertise by assuming that Congress would intend to
delegate all matters within the statute to the expert agency, not the generalist
courts or some other nonexpert agency. A corollary proposition—that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive primacy to an agency when the
347 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015).
348 See Barnett, supra note 40, at 15–16 (discussing how Justices Scalia, Breyer, and
Kagan, and Judge David Barron—in speeches or earlier academic work—have all referred
to the Mead inquiry as a “fictional” or “fraudulent” inquiry into congressional intent as to
interpretive primacy); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549,
562 (2009) (“[A] wide range of legal scholars have [sic] characterized the congressional
delegation rationale for Chevron as a fiction.” (footnote omitted)).
349 See Barnett, supra note 40, at 38–40.
350 See id. at 26–30 (discussing legislative history and text of 12 U.S.C. § 25b, concerning the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s ability to preempt certain state consumer-financial laws).
351 See id.
352 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2005) (“Years have passed since Mead was decided,
and we still lack a clear answer to the question when an agency is entitled to Chevron deference for procedures other than notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication.”).
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agency interprets a statute that many agencies administer, such as the Administrative Procedure Act—makes this focus on expertise clear. An agency
whose interpretation is at issue has no comparative advantage over other
agencies in interpreting shared statutes.353 A more searching inquiry that
considers whether an agency has any expertise in interpreting any particular
statutory provision—as Chief Justice Roberts has advocated354—would prove
more useful. Our call for limiting Chevron deference to matters related to
technical, economic, scientific, or complex statutory expertise is a more
targeted way of addressing the relationship between expertise and
delegation.
Finally, consider how the major-questions doctrine does a better job of
ascertaining delegation. The limited empirical evidence on congressional
delegation supports the judicial inference that Congress does not intend to
delegate major questions of political or economic import to agencies.355 Perhaps the best theory in support of the doctrine is that major questions should
not be open to more than one reasonable interpretation—and thus open to
change with different political winds—because certainty is especially beneficial with significant matters.356 Moreover, as Germany and Canada’s concern with (respectively) “basic”357 questions or “general questions of law of
central importance to the legal system as a whole”358 suggest, the inquiry for
major questions can serve as a backdoor nondelegation doctrine to ensure
that the legislature retains accountability for significant policy decisions.359
Although the Supreme Court (like German and Canadian courts) could do a
much better job of providing guidance on how lower courts should go about
identifying major questions, the inquiry has sufficient empirical and normative support that we recommend retaining it.
353 See PIERCE, supra note 47, § 3.5, at 198–99 (collecting cases).
354 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 322–23 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“If a congressional delegation of interpretive authority is to support Chevron deference,
however, that delegation must extend to the specific statutory ambiguity at issue.”).
355 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV.
901, 1003 (2013) (finding in their empirical study that only small minorities of congressional drafters thought that Congress intended to delegate major questions of economic or
political import to agencies).
356 See Coenen & Davis, supra note 16, at 782 n.11 (“By shifting major questions from
the executive branch, which changes hands at least every eight years, to the Court, the
[major-questions doctrine] might facilitate settlement of regulatory questions that are particularly likely to be politically controversial.”).
357 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
358 See Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigr.) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, para. 17.
359 See Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 977 (2018) (“[I]n
the so-called ‘major questions’ cases—the Court appears to make Chevron do the work of
nondelegation by finding that statutes clearly and unambiguously preclude certain agency
actions that implicate nondelegation concerns, even though the statutes are probably
ambiguous and the agency actions probably reasonable.” (footnote omitted)); see id. at
987–88 (describing other scholars’ similar views when the Court applied the doctrine to
Chevron step one).
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But, aside from the few times that major questions arise in a legal sense,
American courts would do better to engage in an express delegation inquiry.
One option would be to tie expertise and delegation together expressly. The
courts could declare simply that agencies have presumed interpretive primacy to agency interpretations within an agency’s limited forms of expertise.
Notably, this kind of expertise-led inquiry would likely retain certain elements of the Chevron step-zero inquiry: the statute would still be one that the
agency alone administers, and the agency would have space to interpret only
when the statute is ambiguous. If expertise has the narrower understanding
as we propose (technical, scientific, economic, etc.), Chevron’s domain would
be smaller than it currently exists and would have a stronger grounding in
the delegation theory.
Another option would be to follow the Australian Hickman doctrine and
require more legislative action to signify delegation. Recall that the Hickman
doctrine requires that the legislature provide jurisdiction to an agency or
court and limit supervisory courts’ review.360 The Australian High Court
infers that the legislature intends for courts to subject the interpretation to
reasonableness review. Two leading American administrative law scholars,
Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts, recognized that another convention
existed before Chevron: Congress signaled that agencies had force-of-law
authority (and thus interpretive primacy) when it bundled rulemaking
authority with the ability of the agency to impose sanctions in a statute.361
The exact required legislative action is not important. What is important is
that the courts have a purposive inquiry into delegation and require something from Congress more than inaction when deciding who has interpretive
primacy in the liminal space between law and policy. One inquiry into expertise and one into delegation help ensure that Chevron rests firmly on both of
its theoretical haunches.362
One significant objection to our suggestion for more legislative signaling
is that Congress has historically shown little interest in matters of judicial
deference. After all, it has rarely included any express statutory provisions on
deference.363 Suggesting that courts require and look for direct legislative
delegation may appear to be a fool’s errand. It is hard, though, to determine
what Congress would do if courts required more by considering how Congress has behaved when courts have required next to nothing. But we take
360 See supra notes 316–21 and accompanying text.
361 See Merrill & Watts, supra note 16, at 472.
362 As a final matter, American courts could do much better in promoting uniformity,
the remaining justification for Chevron deference. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court
could provide much more guidance on how and when to use the “traditional tools of
statutory construction,” especially when more than one is available. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). But our comparative study here
did not address matters of statutory interpretation, and our studied countries did not
emphasize uniformity as a basis for deference. We leave further consideration for this
American justification for another day.
363 See generally Barnett, supra note 40 (discussing Congress’s first-ever codification of
Skidmore factors and Chevron “savings” clause in 2010).
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some comfort in the fact that Congress once had an understood convention
of delegating—bundling rulemaking and sanctions together.364 This convention worked well, and something similar could be used once again. Moreover, if Congress wants a more robust deference doctrine with a wider
domain than particularized delegations would provide, it can clearly provide
it by a transubstantive statute, such as in the APA, by calling for courts to
permit reasonable agency statutory interpretations.365 Indeed, if Chevron
accurately reflects congressional preferences over interpretive primacy,
enacting the statute should not be especially difficult if courts will not otherwise defer.
By focusing more on step zero, courts would not have to use ambiguity’s
presence or absence as a badly designed proxy for delegation. Instead, Chevron’s focus at step one on ambiguity would more forthrightly concern not
who should resolve the interpretive dispute (i.e., courts or agencies), but how
much room one has to do so. Because none of the countries that we studied
used ambiguity as a trigger for deference, our findings do not provide useful
insight on how U.S. courts should best engage in their step-one inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Neither of us began our research with any particular affinity or aversion
to Chevron. We had only come to be somewhat exhausted by the debates over
Chevron’s virtues or failings. Following earlier efforts to provide quantitative
evidence to these debates, we sought here to engage in a qualitative, comparative study to see how other countries have approached judicial review of
agency statutory interpretation to mitigate American administrative law’s
insular focus. Ultimately, we see that Chevron is neither aberrational nor
inevitable. Assuming that Chevron will continue, our study also convinced us
that other countries offer useful guidance on how to improve Chevron’s functioning and moor it to its theoretical shores.
Whether one agrees with our recommendations, supports Chevron, or
awaits Chevron’s fall from grace, our study should confirm that Chevron’s continued existence or downfall is unlikely to be as important as the American
administrative law cognoscenti—both scholars and bar—may think. For proponents of Chevron, bureaucracy continues even in no- or limited-deference
regimes. Some governments—such as Germany’s and Canada’s—are even
held in high regard by their populations, despite taking very different paths
364 See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
365 One of us has identified the difficulty in codifying Chevron. See Barnett, supra note
40, at 52–53. But Senator Warren’s proposed Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity Act
called for just such a revision to the APA with the following language: “If a statute that an
agency administers is silent or ambiguous, and an agency has followed the procedures in
section 553 or 554 of this title, as applicable, a reviewing court shall defer to the agency’s
reasonable or permissible interpretation of that statute.” S. 3357, 115th Cong. § 311(2)
(2018).
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for judicial review to agency action.366 The end of Chevron would be highly
unlikely to end or significantly hamper the U.S. federal administrative state,
even if Chevron would provide an optimal judicial-review scheme. On the flip
side, the widespread acceptance of some kind of deferential judicial review
should lead Chevron’s detractors to see that deference does not lead to technocratic states that fail to appreciate separated powers or individual rights,
even if these countries could better promote individual liberty and improved
bureaucratic decisionmaking. If anything, our study indicates that the uniformity justification—present for Chevron but absent for other deference doctrines—needs more attention and may better guide the debate over the
effectiveness of deference doctrines. In short, the debate over Chevron is still
important, but comparative study provides perspective—and maybe, with a
lowered rhetorical temperature, improvements.

366 See, e.g., Keith Neuman, In Spite of Growing Populist Trends, Canadians’ Confidence in
Major Public Institutions Has Remained Steady for the Past Decade, POL’Y OPTIONS (Aug. 2,
2018), https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2018/canadians-confidence-innational-institutions-steady/ (discussing Canadians’ high and increased confidence in their
national government, among other things); Government at a Glance 2017, OECDILIBRARY,
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2017_gov_glance-2017en (last visited Oct. 29, 2020) (discussing Germans’ strong and increasing trust in its government from 2007 until 2016).
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